By the same Author

STAFFORDSHIRE POTTERY AND ITS HISTORY

THE ROAD TO FREEDOM

STAFFORDSHIRE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY

THE FUTURE OF THE INDO-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

ESSAYS AND ADVENTURES OF A LABOUR M.P

LOCAL TAXATION IN THE EMPIRE

THE SEVENTH DOMINION

by

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PREFACE

They will say on reading this book that I am an Imperialist. That is not a charge which seriously perturbs a Labour Member of Parliament; we have Mr. Thomas Johnstone, and I have suspicions in connection with Mr. David Kirkwood. If it be Imperialism to be convinced that the race that spread from, and came to, these islands is the finest on earth and in history, then I am an Imperialist, though I hardly think that my reasons for the faith would appeal to the fascist, fox-hunting, nigger-kicking people who too often annex the name and tarnish the lustre.

Since the last Imperial Conference we may say with certainty that the British Commonwealth is a league of nations that are not afraid of each other; and therefore a surer guarantee against more wars than a league of nations which are afraid of each other. America is much more likely to join or support our League of Nations than the other League of Nations, and that will settle the matter. Meanwhile, I want the Jews in our League.

That is the object of this book: to add Palestine as another free feather in our cap of democracy—that the Jews, too, should be "of the family."

At present, politically at least, the progress of Palestine in any direction seems to be nobody's business, save that of the Jews. But it is England's business. Our credit is at stake; our capacity for creating free nations (our best boast) is being doubted; too much is being risked. One would think that the

creation of free friendly nations was so easy that no one had to think at all. " We put Palestine on the road ; what more is there left to do ? " So they seem to say. Yet there is great danger of the road being lost.

There is danger in the growing alienation between the Jews and the British administration in Palestine. What the Jews are saying openly can be seen and read at Geneva and at the Zionist Conference at Basle. What they are saying in private one may guess. What the British governors in Palestine are saying, or may start saying, is as follows : " Confound the Jews ; they are always grumbling. We gave them the Balfour Declaration " (they will claim that, though it was a British Government in England which did the giving), " and still they are not satisfied. We are tired of being abused. Let us get responsible Government established. Let us see how they like having to deal with Arab rulers." If they feel that their responsibilities are only to Jews and Arabs even the best British officials might become exasperated under criticism from those they believe themselves to be protecting. Responsible government is so very tempting a way of escape from responsibility. See how it attracts a harassed Colonial Office whenever Kenya is mentioned ! But they are also responsible to England.

An exasperated Zionist, Mr. Lipsky I think, urged the Jews to be more vigorous in protest—Captain Jabotinsky and the Revisionists say the same. " England only, and always, gives way to force." No doubt they are right, though one might substitute the name of every other country for England with equal accuracy. But in the case of Palestine, " England giving way " means Eastern—Arab, Moslem—rule for Palestine. All England loses by " giving way," is the hope, or dream, of seeing Palestine a free self-governing Dominion

within the British Empire, and perhaps a little honour, the friendship of the Jewish people, and the credit of combining justice with success.

Whether officials or Jews like it or not, it is essential for the success of the Palestine adventure that Crown colony rule and the domination of the British Colonial Office should endure for at least a generation, till Western educated men and minds are there in sufficient numbers to ensure the safety of the settlers and of the natives.

Already, since this book went to the publishers, a treaty has been made with the Emir Abdulla creating some responsible government in Transjordania and reducing the responsibilities of the Colonial Office, though not, I fear, the responsibilities of the British taxpayer. It is ominous; the same thing might happen any moment in Palestine if the drift apart is allowed to continue.

The drift apart might be stopped, the danger reduced in two ways. First, let an Englishman, not a Jew, criticise. English officials take criticism better from an Englishman than from Jews. He starts from their level, is in the family, has the same ideals, has nothing to gain. If some one must criticise it is better that he should; even if it is resented, the drift apart is not widened.

But how should one criticise? Which manner produces the best results? You may praise, and hint a doubt with hope of persuading; or you may pick out all you dislike and hit as hard as possible. Whether you get most by making men purr or curse is a question of psychology. Personally, I prefer the second method; men may sit up and curse, but if you are honest, honest men will believe you. I want the administration to believe that changes are necessary. And I want the Jews to know that they have English friends who

see with their eyes, and as clearly, that changes are necessary.

For the second way of stopping the drift apart is that English people should show more friendship for Jews. It is true that in the House of Commons we have set up a pronouncedly aristocratic pro-Palestine Committee of seventy members, with a Jew as secretary, to watch the development of the Mandate policy in Palestine. Outside Parliament also an energetic English committee—including those friends of the good cause, Sir Wyndham Deedes, Mrs. Dugdale and Mrs. Snowden—carry on against the anti-semitism of the suburbs. Even the Press has shown some sign of a change in the stock attitude towards Jews which has been common form for 2,000 years. But much more has to be done.

The double-edged method of this book is, therefore, obvious.

JOSIAH C. WEDGWOOD.

SEPTEMBER 14TH, 1927.

THE SEVENTH DOMINION

CHAPTER I

THE SEVENTH DOMINION

Do we, or do we not, want to have the new Izrael a Dominion within the British Empire? One has just this question to ask of those who are responsible for the present government of Palestine. All hangs on the answer to that question. We have in Lower Canada a French partner; in Ireland a reluctant Irish partner; in South Africa a Dutch partner; and in India, Ceylon and Burma we expect and hope to have some day quite non-European partners in that new Union into which the Imperial Conference of 1926 has converted the old Empire.

Do we, or do we not, want the Jews also as partners? Are we overdoing this commonwealth business? Is it going to spoil the stock? Will it be the elders of Zion who will perhaps swallow us? Is it that Jews are so disliked in Poland and Hungary and Roumania that we ought to dislike them too in order to be in the fashion? Or is it that they are not Christians like the French Canadians? We must make up our minds one way or the other. Not to have a mind at all, not to have a policy, is too silly a position for responsible Englishmen to take up. But when I put this question to those who rule Palestine they will not answer; they shuffle out of it, saying, "Anyway, the Jews would not agree to come in."

It should be obvious that whether the Jews would agree to come in would depend very largely on whether they are made welcome. I believe that all sensible Englishmen, and His Majesty's Government, and (more than most) the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Colonel Amery, all want them in, and want to make them welcome. All these will answer the question without shuffling, and we cannot afford to have our policy spoilt by " the man on the spot " whose duty it is to carry out that policy, whatever his private view may be. We see that they can spoil it merely by bad manners, the poison which lost us America, and may yet lose us India.

After the South African war there were, I have no doubt, many who derided the idea of a free South African Dominion ; in future, we were to show the Boer who was master ! But we who then governed South Africa from within Lord Milner's kindergarten had not such stupid views. We made friends with the Boers, helped them with cash and sympathy, even danced with them to our mutual satisfaction. We welcomed them in, showed them an Englishman's best side, and now they are usefully within, and nobody doubts but that we did right. We did that job well. I hate to see a similar job being done badly. It injures our prestige.

Presumably, the best reasons for wanting the Jews in the family are that their friendship and custom are worth having and that we have so many traits in common—an inclination to lend money and take risks, a passion for wandering over the earth, a dislike of working for a master (called independence), and a lamentable preference for the Old Testament with its doctrine of " hit him first and hit him hard," to the New Testament and pacifism. There are some fourteen million Jews in existence, well peppered over the world ;

not more than a million are likely ever to be loyal subjects to King George in Palestine, but those that remain in America are better to have as friends than enemies. Those who do settle in Palestine are likely to be of real political and commercial service to the Empire, for Palestine is the Clapham Junction of the Commonwealth. The air routes, as well as the ocean routes, east and west, and south and north, cross here, where one flank rests on the Suez Canal and the other on the port of Haifa, the natural trade base of Mesopotamia. With pipe-line and railway debouching at Haifa under Carmel, the British Fleet can look after the Near East in comfort and safety. Egypt does not want us; we have no friends there. Palestine is emphatically a place where we do want a friendly and efficient population—men on whom we can depend, if only because they depend on us.

The Jews depend on us; they also prefer us as the least anti-semitic people of the world. It would have been natural for American Jews to have urged in 1919 that the Mandate for Palestine should be conferred upon America, or for the French Jews to have shown their patriotism by demanding France as Mandatory; but all with one accord demanded, and themselves secured, Britain as the Mandatory Power. The fact is, they are almost the only non-Anglo-Saxon people who seem to believe that on the whole England does try to behave decently towards other people. This is soothing at a time when the Chinese will insist that we are the worst of a bad bunch. I agree with the Jews rather than with the Chinese—we all do. It shows that the Jews understand us!

Also they depend on us. How often have I been told, and how rarely by Jews, that the Jews intend to secure an independent Palestine. The people who tell me this are the people who wish it were true—the

people who have seen to it with alacrity that Jews and Arabs shall have a Palestinian and not a British citizenship, and Palestinian passports, and the head of an Egyptian king instead of King George upon the coins. Such people live with their heads in the sand. It is they who want the Jews of Palestine to be aliens. They do not see that the Jews themselves cannot desire such exclusion. In these latter years what little nation of the Mediterranean would wish to be deprived of the protection of the British Fleet? Indeed, which little nation would not pay to have such protection? For the fear of Signor Mussolini and of the Roman fasces lies heavy on all, from Angora to Madrid, which once were provinces of Rome. Indeed, in every direction the future Palestine is likely to have uncomfortable bed-fellows—Ibn Saud, for instance, is a restless person. But those who pretend that Jews will insist on separation have missed another incident which others have observed. After the decision of the last Imperial Conference protection is no longer humiliation. The Equal Union now presented by the British Empire confers protection without destroying independence or self-respect. The Jews would be fools if they did not want to enter such an Union. The question still remains, "Do we want to black-ball them and keep them out?"

Put the question in another way. When the Jews are in a majority in Palestine, and when we confer upon that new colony Responsible Government (as we are bound to do, mandate or no mandate, sooner or later), are the new rulers of Palestine to look for protection to the British Empire, or to the League of Nations? With this alternative before them one knows that the British people prefer that Palestine should look to the Empire, and that Jews should not be black-balled. As plain realists the British have perceived that moral as

well as commercial advantages may well repay and balance the risks of protecting Palestine. But let us be under no misapprehension on this matter; it is possible still to throw Palestine into the arms and under the shield of the League of Nations instead of into the British Union. The Syrians and Christians of Jerusalem would naturally prefer for their protection a League of Nations which is so profoundly influenced by the Papal Curia. British officials in Palestine can easily make Jews prefer the League also if day after day they show that Palestine and the Jews are not wanted inside the British Empire.

To understand the mind of the British in Palestine, both rulers and such residents as there are—to see why they are not hitting it off with the Jews—why there is growing up this state of haughty aloofness between Jew and Englishman in Palestine, one must realise first that Palestine was only born in 1919. But English were there before, and Christians were there before—not just the average English and Christians, but missionaries whose very environment and profession made them anti-Jew if not anti-Semite. Jerusalem was the centre of the latest war of the religions, and the Turk or Syrian who kept the outward peace was respectable, even an ally, in contrast with the rival Jew. Long before 1919 the acceptable small-talk among the English in Jerusalem consisted in stories about Jews—their folly, their dirt, their greed; and the Jews have and do reciprocate with stories about the missionaries—their folly, their manners, their ignorant conceit. The servant problem and the motor car are submerged in Palestinian small-talk.

Into this I-must-tell-you-a-story-about-the-Jews Society, came the first batch of British officials, ex-army, ex-Egypt. The tone of the service in Egypt has necessarily been very different from the tone of the

service in India, or Africa, or Malaya. Egypt has been under the Foreign Office, where diplomacy plays a larger part than administration. It has not been the business of British officials in Egypt to protect the native workers, or to develop exports and imports, or generally to act as a beneficent State. Their business was to avoid trouble with the native administration so far as was compatible with financial stability and the safety of foreign financial interests. Duties to the weak, or duties to Great Britain, were never stressed in Egypt.

With the Army, in the Army, there came into Palestine officials of this sort, with this background; and they fitted in to the English missionary suburban society, and took on the old stories and old jealousies. This first batch were tired men and disillusioned. They did not come into Palestine as we did into the Transvaal of 1902, solely anxious to play an Elizabethan part in building up an Empire, but with the fear of demobilisation before their eyes.

Moreover, military circles in Egypt were pledged to Feisul and Hussein and the Arab nationalists. In their arrangements for a peace settlement there was no room for a Jewish homeland, and when they were overruled by the British Government they became only reluctant agents for that Government; enthusiasm in their service was dashed. Indeed, for some years, they imagined that they could reverse the policy of the Government, and they were not too nice in the methods they employed to that end. Officials who are dragged along are never helpful; and, as the resentment could not be shown conveniently at home, it was indicated the more clearly to the Jews.

This resentment, this reluctance, should have come to an end when the Colonial Office took over from the War Office and the Generals left, when Sir Herbert

Samuel went out as High Commissioner in 1920. Gradually officials with Colonial Office mind and training replaced the old. But, though you may change a few higher officials, it is difficult to change the public feeling of a governing class. A strong lead from on top might have changed the tone of this missionary anti-Jew society, but such a tone could not be set by Sir Herbert Samuel, being himself a Jew and lacking the assurance of an established position in a bigger world.

It is not only in society that the religious play a large part. Their every political instinct is against the new prospects opening up for the land which they have made more than their own. To them Palestine is the Holy Land, a land of shrines and memories, to be preserved as it was in the time of Our Saviour, unsullied by modernism and materialism. To the Zionist, Palestine is a land to be filled with prosperous settlers and teeming factories, the banner of the West pushed forward into the sleepy East. It is not a wholly unworthy motive which makes the whole governing class —civil, military and religious—look upon the development of Palestine into a prosperous twentieth-century Judæo-British Colony with repugnance. They view with equal displeasure the advent of Jewish capital, and Jewish settlers, and American tourists ; they all " vulgarise the Holy Land."

This attitude can easily be understood ; many will sympathise with it, though that is too much to expect of the Jews, other than the ultra-religious Agudah. And it explains everything. The Turks may have gone, but Turkey endures in Jerusalem—the streets, the smells, the flies, and even Turkish justice. That the Turks themselves are Westernising from Angora is no reason why virtuous British should Westernise from the Holy City. Indeed, the new Turk has become an

example of what to avoid. Mustapha Pasha Kemal may abolish fezzes and veils and monks, but in Jerusalem we reverence and conserve the old. Above all, we preserve the older varieties of religion ; and all the efforts of the administration are expended on the preservation from bankruptcy of the Greek Orthodox Church, so that their suburban lands may not come into the market and be sacrilegiously bought up by Jews. All, where possible, is to be as it was of old. Taxes, justice, civil and religious codes, the separation into autonomous communities of the various religions. Turkey may change, Turkey may become sacrilegious and forget the good old times, but the most Catholic Government of Palestine, never !

So there is, for many reasons, a reluctance to Westernise, to educate, to change ; and if the reluctance is there, the means of expressing such reluctance are simple. Every step in the development of the Colony must be viewed with excessive caution ; and to justify that caution we must pray in aid, not the preservation of the antique, but the more popularly attractive preservation of the interests of the native. There is something very laudable about this, and also something eminently religious, but it makes indignant those of us who have desired to preserve the interests of the native in Kenya, and who have succeeded in doing so elsewhere in Africa. We are perhaps better judges of the interests of the native than the Syrian intelligentsia, whose interest it is to keep the native as ignorant and as badly paid as he was under Turkish rule.

That we may see how these "natives" [1] are affected by the Jewish immigration, it is necessary to divide them into four categories. The fellaheen, the town worker, the grazier Bedouin, the middle and professional classes.

[1] To-day there are in Palestine about 160,000 Jews and 740,000 Arabs.

The fellaheen, whether in Egypt or Syria or Palestine, are the cultivators of the soil, living on the margin of subsistence—poorest of the poor. They are neither fanatically Moslem, nor at all anti-Semite; their one desire is to make a living and have no trouble with the police. The Government which takes a tithe of their crop is their only outside interest. In Palestine two-thirds of these fellaheen till their own land—the village land, held more or less in common. Where they have more land than they cultivate the village is quite ready to sell the surplus to the Zionists, and they get a big price for it. Whenever they lose land which they are cultivating, they are compensated with land elsewhere. The money of the Jews, the example set by the Jews in modern cultivation and manuring, the new markets for the produce in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, all have helped materially this type of "native," and everywhere they told me they had no quarrel with their Jew neighbours to whom they look up as better educated. Most of the land the Jews have bought from the Syrian effendis who owned, but did not cultivate or use, the Valley of Jezreel. Most of these absentee landlords have now been bought out at a price double the economic value of the land. From this too the fellaheen benefits, as the drainage stops malaria, the roads open up their country, doctors, veterinary surgeons and sanitary services are now available for all. The Government which, "in the interests of the native," is so reluctant to allow the Jew to come to Palestine, has done no draining, and leaves the Jewish Hadassah to provide most of the sanitary service for the native fellaheen.

The Arab or Christian town worker, native of the country, has benefited more even than the fellaheen from the advent of the Jew. His opportunities for employment are immeasurably greater; he suffers

from no unemployment ; and consequently his wages and standard of comfort have risen, and his skill also. His wages have almost doubled, and now reach from 10 to 15 piastres a day (2*s.* to 3*s.*). A large number are already in the joint trades unions, and I judge from their speeches, to which I have listened, that they form not the least progressive portions of these trades unions. The Jews have civilised these " natives," and, judged by the wages standard, they have civilised them upwards. Here, too, did the Government really wish it, they could protect the interests of the natives and of the Jew by paying wages which permitted of the higher standard of culture. Government is the chief employer, and a fair wages clause in Government contracts (often asked for, but never granted) would prevent the discrimination between Jew and Arab labour so dangerous to both parties. But that cant phrase, " the interests of the native," has become a cloak for " the interests of the employer "—in Palestine as in Kenya.

The nomad, grazing Arab, called the Bedouin, has not benefited from the advent of the Jews ; and if it be to his benefit that he remain ever a grazing nomad, no advance of civilisation can be of benefit to him. Ever the ranch and the cow-boy and the nomad, has to go back as the plough moves forward. We shall miss those picturesque sheiks with their bold black eyes, but we cannot hold up civilisation for them to smirk across the film for ever. They are not much in evidence in Palestine now, since brigandage has ceased to be prosperous. Arabia is their spiritual and economic home. One finds them in the south round Beersheba, where there are no Jewish settlements, and in the winter in the low-lying marshes of Huleh and Beisan. The Government is protecting them by presuming that they own these winter grazings, forcing the Jews to

purchase the marsh from the Bedouin before they may be permitted to drain it. If we are to judge from the Beisan settlement, the interests of the Jews and Bedouin are indeed antagonistic, and Government is truly protecting the interest of the native. One may feel, however, that a little drainage is worth a ton of sentiment.

This Bedouin problem will not become serious till the new civilisation spreads into Transjordania. For the moment the present rulers of Palestine have put both their feet down firmly with a stamp. Whether Palestine is or is not to be ruined by these Jews, they shall never, never be allowed into the paradise of Transjordania—either as settlers, or armed forces, or police, or postmen. Druse refugees—yes, they are in keeping with the picture—but Jews, never ! The Jordan is the Rubicon beyond which is to lie safe for ever the immaculate East. But the present rulers will not remain for ever, and the British taxpayer will at some early day refuse to go on paying taxes in order to keep order in the inviolate Trans-Jordan. Palestine pays half already for the frontier force, and will pay more in return for union with these rich lands beyond the Hills of Moab.

There remain the intellectuals. How are they affected ? Before the War the intellectuals of Palestine were the Syrians, mostly Catholic, mostly speaking French. Many of the absentee landlords are still domiciled in Syria—French subjects. Politically, racially and religiously, they view English and Jews with instinctive hostility, and use all their influence against both Mandate and the Balfour Declaration. They were the governing caste, and still are so to no inconsiderable extent. They create the public opinion of Palestine, or they have money and can pay to create it. Living among the governors and associating with

them, they can influence them as no other element can; while, where Jews are concerned, all the professional intellectuals—doctors, lawyers, accountants, civil servants—resent the competition of the new Jew intellectual. Under any British administration their position is not what it was, but without the Jews they would still be in a privileged position as the best educated of natives.

So far as the Moslem merchants are concerned, and they too have always had some education, the Jew who spends his money arouses no religious fervour. *Non olet.* The Moslems, merchants and landlords, are too busy making money to worry about a customer's religion. They leave that " smelling-out " business to the Christian sects—leave it with a lordly contempt.

Employers of labour of every creed resent the new and higher wages which Western Jews inspire. They resent the greater independence which contact with the new Jews has provoked in hitherto docile servants.

So that many intellectuals register the acme of dislike by actually refusing to sell land to Jews, even for an excessive price. In explanation, they fall back upon religion, and not in vain; comfort is provided. Jerusalem seems populated by innumerable repetitions of Mr. Hilaire Belloc in sweeping black robes—less clever, of course, less educated, but also with less to distract them from contemplation of the supreme issue: " Who crucified Jesus Christ? " Nowhere else, outside Jerusalem, is this so live an issue, so complete an answer to all argument. The Agudah are to be pitied in that, by reason of their faith, they are debarred from a prop to prejudice so devastatingly sufficient.

So do economics and religion act and react, so do governors and the governing caste act and react upon one another, and the least common denominator is to

be found in the semi-religious chaunt, " In the interests of the native we resist all change." The Seventh Dominion starts on its progress against a dead weight of resistance to any such thing and to any such progress.

CHAPTER II

CRITICISM OF A SECRETARIAT

THE reluctance to change, referred to in the previous chapter, has been carried to unusual lengths—unusual, that is, for the British Empire. We have moved more quickly in Tanganyika, also a mandated territory; Mombasa is more sanitary than Jerusalem; roads and education in Ceylon or Malaya are manifestly superior; Palestinian methods of taxation would, one can safely say, be tolerated in no sort of Crown colony. The best they can say of Jerusalem is that it smelt worse and looked worse when we first got there; which is, of course, possible; but in another part of old Turkey the Turks are reforming quite quickly. The Western virus, if it be a virus, is infecting Angora, Bagdad and Beyrout. We have been in charge of Palestine now for eight years. Let us see how administrative matters stand.

Taxation

There are, of course, no income taxes, super-taxes, nor death duties; but there are the usual duties on goods brought into the country. At a time when in the rest of the world manufacturers are extorting from rulers protective tariffs upon finished articles imported by their competitors, one discovers with surprise a country where the reverse happens, where the import duty on raw materials exceeds that on the finished article so as to give a bonus to the foreign manufacturer. But this is quite explicable if Government does not wish factories to sully the fair face of Palestine.

However, except in the case of sugar and chocolate, this strange system has now at last been ended.

The two chief direct taxes are the Tithe and the Wergo, and both constitute the most damning indictment of the Palestinian Government. Their sole merit is that they are the same as were levied by the Turk before the War. All that Sir Herbert Samuel can say to excuse the continuance of the Tithe is that, whereas the Turks during the War increased it from 10 per cent. to 12½ per cent., he, following the example of Angora, dropped it again to 10 per cent. a few years ago.

The Tithe is a tax on the gross produce of agriculture. The peasant may not sell his harvested crop till the Assistant District Commissioner has seen it and assessed its value. This assessment of value, where quality varies, is excessively difficult; the Assistant District Commissioner is a highly-paid British official whose time is wasted; the crop has to wait, and perhaps rot upon the floor or miss the market. As no allowance is made for the costs of production, intensive cultivation is made at a loss; the more idle a man is the less he pays. The Government is largely swindled, and dishonesty rewarded. In fact, no one who has anything to do, either with the payment or collection of this tax, has anything to say in its favour; but we have let it go on for eight years.

No doubt the fault may lie with the Colonial Office and not with the Secretariat, for the Average Tithe Committee reported a year ago, and still no action has been taken. But here, too, the old system and the delay has been particularly unfair to the new Jews. By reclamation, drainage and manuring, they produce relatively large crops from land which did produce little or nothing. The more expensive and successful their production the higher is the tithe they pay. At Benjamina, where they grow jasmine for perfumes, the

crop is worth, when picked, at least £60 an acre; but the picking is very expensive, so that the profit is not to be measured by the gross value of the product. If the full tithe were really exacted from these people, they must close down at once. Producers of bananas or peaches or table grapes, and, above all, oranges, are in like case. No attempt is made to extract the tithe on vegetables; that would be too absurd.

Clear as all District Commissioners are as to the vices of this tax, they are equally clear as to what should take its place. They want a grading of the land into three grades, and a similarly graded tax *per* acre upon all land, whether used or not. To me they naturally defined it as a land value tax.[1] Then, the more a man produces the more he would profit, and wasteful misuse of land would be penalised. Then the Assistant Commissioner could do his work in a quarter of the time; then the crops need not wait to be sold; then arrears would cease or become permanently secured on the land; then both the individual and the State would know where they were. Above all, the big landlords and effendis who do not cultivate would have to pay on their unused lands, and this would induce them to sell at lower prices to the Jews. I think the effendi interests have had something to do with the long delay in making this change.

The Tithe Committee urge that they cannot grade and value the land and change to a land tax, until the cadastral survey has been made, determining boundaries and ownerships. As this will take about ten years, they suggest a temporary scheme, which has the

[1] The Average Tithe Committee reported in July, 1926: The best final solution of the present position is a Land Tax, but a fully satisfactory Land Tax cannot be introduced without an elaborate fiscal survey . . . an effort should be made to devise a temporary system, possessing as many as possible of the advantages of a land tax.

support of those engaged in collecting the tithe. They propose to average the tithe paid by each cultivator during the last four years, and to stabilise at that figure for the future without measuring and valuing any more crops. This, too, would help the Jews, and it has not yet been done.

The Wergo is a tax upon real estate. The valuation upon which the tax is based is a very old one, so old as to be beyond memory. Many of the rural Wergo registers are actually missing. All agreed that, when originally made by Turkish officials, wise people for a money payment secured more favourable terms and a lower valuation. As one would expect, all unbuilt-on suburban land escapes valuation. But what makes the Palestinian Wergo so perfect an example of injustice and so unique is that the valuation is being continually brought up to date in patches. Whenever real property is sold the purchase price (as declared by the buyer) takes the place of the old valuation. The tax is a heavy one—2 per cent., I believe, in Jerusalem—and it would naturally be at a heavy rate, seeing that the valuation is normally about one-tenth of the real value. People, therefore, who buy land and declare the full price they paid, have to pay about ten times more in Wergo than did their predecessors in title, or ten times as much as does their competitor next door who inherited his property, or leased it instead of buying, or who had simply not declared its true purchase price. Under these circumstances few purchasers declare the true price they paid. But they know that a British official may take it into his head to make inquiries at any moment, and can check their price and make criminals of them. It is not good that any British official should have this power unless he exercises it in every case, but at least we may be glad that it is a British official, for the temptation to bribe must be enormous.

All new buildings, new houses, new factories—which find it more difficult to conceal their cost—are, of course, worse penalised. While the Wergo exceeds the Tithe in its manifest injustice and encouragement of dishonesty, it will be seen that it is quite as effective in discouraging any sort of development or enterprise. That such a tax should have endured for eight years is a blot upon Colonial Office administration. But a last consideration is the worst—Why is the Wergo retained? When the native Syrian property owner is found out making a false declaration of value, he can plead immemorial custom, and too often "get away with it"; but the Jew can have no more than his pound of flesh. The purchasers of property are mostly the new incoming Jews. The Wergo has come to be a special tax on all purchasers of property, and it is especially difficult for a Jew to evade. Here the Jews may be excused for seeing a reason why the Wergo is retained. If they had not throughout the ages to put up with injustice like this the crime of the Wergo could not have endured eight years while a free Press exists in England.

A re-valuation of Jerusalem, Haifa and Jaffa could be made in six weeks and the Wergo put right so far as the towns are concerned. The average Tithe Committee recommended that the rural Wergo should be added to and consolidated with the prospective land tax. Equality of treatment would then be assured, revenue would be greater, the owners of vacant building land would be more ready to sell, and an injustice to the Jews, almost mediæval in character, would have been put an end to.

The Colonial Office is admirably served, as it were, by a miracle. The best of England are picked out by a Selection Board in Whitehall to "go out and govern New South Wales," and the remarkable truth is that

they go out without any education for the business and yet, on the whole, do well. Their standards, if not their education, are good ; tradition keeps them up to the mark in Nigeria, and even in Kenya. Never does one hear of one of them being corrupt, or even of travelling second class and drawing for a first-class ticket. Yet a little knowledge would be helpful, even in their profession. The Colonial Office might issue a manual of information and instruction as a guide. This manual, were I producing it, should contain, for instance, the principles of taxation enunciated by the accepted authorities ; that a tax should be capable of universal application ; that it should not be easy to evade ; that it should be cheap to collect ; that it should, as little as might be, hamper trade and development. If these principles had been known in Palestine, neither the Tithe nor the Wergo could have endured for eight years.

The manual would also contain samples of well-working experience in other colonies. The stamping of documents, and the charges therefore, are not really so abstruse a matter. It is managed in other colonies intelligibly, and if the Palestinian officials had known of this, the law, or laws, or absence of law, relating to the stamping of documents in Palestine, would not still be persisted in to the grave loss of the public revenue and of the private temper.

Local Government

No doubt the manual would have to be brought up to date occasionally, so as to record definite decisions as to policy reached by the Colonial Office. On communal representation, for instance, the Colonial office have a definite opinion. They dislike communal representation and consider it undesirable ; but where any community cannot be persuaded that their

interests will be sufficiently protected without it, they will permit its introduction temporarily, and in a manner which will facilitate revision. They consider themselves to be rather more up to date on this matter than is the India Office. But one can see that when the Palestinian Government took to thinking out how they should give local self-government in the towns, they tackled the problem of communal representation as though nobody had ever heard of it before. Nobody wanted it in Palestine, and very few had ever heard of it, except some Jews from Moravia, who recollected that it had been the practice in the old Austrian Empire, where it worked badly as usual. But the framers of the Palestinian Constitution discovered it, and loved the idea, and have put it through with almost child-like glee. In this manner they educate the " natives " in democracy !

There are to be three separate lists of electors—Moslem, Christian, Jew—one-tenth of the electors on any list may nominate a candidate, but he must be from their own list ; the number of electors *on the roll* (independent of the number voting) determine the number of each religion that can be elected.[1] There is no educational test, but the elector must be over twenty-five, must be a Palestinian citizen, and must not be a woman. Unlike the wise practice in India, the new municipality must have no Englishman to guide

[1] The elections in Jerusalem under the new law have just taken place. The number of electors determined that there should be six Moslems, four Jews, and three Christians elected. The Jews, being politically intelligent, arranged matters among themselves and only put forward four candidates, who were therefore *ipso facto* elected. But, under the system, all the Jews still had the right to vote, and not having to vote for their own people they could vote for the other religious lists where there were more candidates than seats. So they voted for and elected those Moslems and Christians who were not anti-semite. A very happy result, but the Christians or Moslems might think of that dodge next time.

them, and no British subject can be elected or even have a vote.

It is well known that British and American citizens do not willingly change their citizenship. One may say, too, without false pride, that British and American Jews are the most intelligent citizens in Palestine. So the new law makes British subjects in a British territory into outlaws. British subjects are not all Jews, but, to keep the British Jews out, all Britishers are made to suffer—and the municipal councils are deprived of educated guidance. In all other colonies care is taken to exaggerate, so far as it may justly be done, the influence of the more educated and responsible members of the community. For instance, in Kenya, the European settlers being few, and Western and educated, there is an educational test as well as a property test for voters. In most colonies the municipal voter must be able to read and write in English or the vernacular. Even the most pro-native critic accepts some such tests as inevitable, in order to weight brains against numbers. But in Palestine they reverse the obvious. Educated people, being more largely Jew, have no advantage at the polls. In Kenya, to increase the educated vote, educated women have been given the franchise. In Palestine most of such women would be Jewesses, therefore no women are to have the franchise. In Kenya, or in Tanganyika, which is a mandated territory, because the new-comers are more intelligent than natives—being British subjects—they get the vote after a year's residence. In Palestine, as the new-comers are mostly Jews, they do not get the vote till they have become Palestinian citizens, a process which always takes a considerable time.

In the British Empire we have samples of every sort of auto- and demo-cracy. There must be fifty different municipal council ordinances—so different that they

have obviously never been compared or even read for precedents. But there is not a single one of these ordinances or laws which refuse the vote to British subjects, and not one which puts the age limit at twenty-five instead of twenty-one. This eccentricity is left for Palestine. There can be only one explanation. The European civilised Jew is coming in young ; they have not their normal proportion of older folk. Therefore we reduce the electoral influence of the more civilised immigrants to exaggerate the electoral influence of the less civilised oldest inhabitants. There will be votes for the Jews of the Wailing Wall, but none for the Jews of Nahalal.

These municipal councils, composed of persons elected on religious grounds, from which anything British or Western is so carefully excluded, will not, as originally in India, be presided over by an English official. Fortunately they will have no control over education or police ; but paving, lighting, sewering, and health will keep them all adequately busy, and will require funds. Here we are in the realms of the unknown. Who will pay ? I think we can see that religious interests will be adequately protected. Religious property in the old city of Jerusalem is exempt from State taxation. Very few religious in the old city pay any rent at all. One feels that here is a precedent for making such property free from local taxation also ; and inside the walls of Jerusalem a very large portion of the town belongs to these exempt religious foundations. Obviously, the new Jews can pay, instead of these charitable pious persons who are always so poor.

So most of the funds of the new municipalities will come from rates levied upon the new industries and new houses, and also, no doubt, from large grants in aid from the Government. The municipalities will

spend the money, dividing it as fairly as they can between the three religions, according to their strength on the council. Every scavenger will be selected by faith and not by works; a consummation less satisfactory for work than for faith, and the New Jerusalem can remain a subject for prayer.

Labour Legislation

Labour legislation naturally suffers from the prevailing lack of interest in the Jews, or of sympathy with Western economic ideas. A very limited Workmen's Compensation Act has been enacted this year; but there is nothing in the nature of health insurance or factory legislation, nor, of course, pensions. There is no unemployment insurance, no minimum wage in sweated trades, no fair wages clause in Government contracts. Egypt has none of these things, India very few; if Palestine is the land of an Eastern people, it can quite well do without them also. But, to show that they are alive to the dangers of trades unionism, and quite up to date, a law is being enacted to define trades union intimidation in accordance with the definitions of the new Bill now being put upon the Statute Book in England.

Though wages are lower in Palestine than in Great Britain, at least in the ratio of five to seven, yet the cost of living is quite as high. This is due partly to the high price of land and partly to the Egyptian currency, which is still used. The smallest coin in use in Palestine is the Egyptian piastre—2½*d*. A Currency Committee has long since reported in favour of the pound sterling, divided into a thousand "mills,"[1] which would provide a smaller coin for the marketing housewife. But, as so often happens, nothing has yet been done. It is held

[1] "*Mil*," a Levantine French word, preferred to "farthing."

to be a concession to the Arab intellectuals that the head of King George will not appear on the new coinage. The new postage stamps, just produced, also avoid anything so crassly British. No one could charge the Palestinian Administration with failing to cherish " native " susceptibilities.

Agriculture

Palestine has a Director of Agriculture with a considerable knowledge of pedigree stock which is sometimes overwhelming to the native Syrian breeds. As the Jews do their own agricultural research, nursery and stock breeding and training, there is less for the Director to do. His province is usurped. He is compelled by this somewhat short-sighted Jewish policy to work for the Arab alone ; and his annual report makes witty reading from the exuberance of his " digs " at the rival Jewish agronomes. The violence of his criticism is only surpassed by my own.

Education

The Director of Education related to me an interesting talk that he had had with an Arab fellah. The fellah complained of too cruel taxation—the hand of England was too heavy. But, on consideration, he was forced to admit that the three benefits of English rule more than balanced Tithe and Wergo. What were these benefits ? Education, Roads, and Safety. They were new. The Turks gave none of them. Even now there are more Jewish children in Jewish schools than there are Arab children in Government schools, though the Arab population outnumbers the Jew by five to one.

People in Palestine have a passion for education ; it is the first rung in that ladder of civilisation which they wish to climb. Once acquired, it enables them to

emigrate, to qualify for Government posts, to adopt European clothes—in a word, to make money and get away from where they are. What can a poor Director do, even one who knows what real education is, but has no teachers with that knowledge? Government has provided an enormous number of excessively cheap elementary schools, and has paid an enormous number of town-bred Arabs and Syrians to teach something. They have established a training college for native teachers; otherwise the only good schools are missionary proselytising schools. What they need are English men and women of the modern sort to establish Boy Scouts, Girl Guides, football and gymnastics—leaders to draw the new race out and up.

Governments must face the facts, however. Real education really does mean teaching men to get away from where they are. It must be subversive. It is no use trying to combine real education with the preservation of the old order and the Holy Land of the picture books. I am afraid that in Palestine the Secretariat will not have English taught, nor the English cult of freedom. We taught India that, and though most know that we did right, yet reactionaries think otherwise, and so naturally will those who wish to keep things and men as they are in Palestine.

Police

The second boon was safety. Robbers and highwaymen no longer flourish in Palestine. The police force might learn something from Sir Frederick Halliday in Greece; for Asia, however, it is a model; though underpaid, it is not suspected of corruption. It is so underpaid that Jews can hardly live upon the pay, especially in the towns where most of the Jewish police are to be found. This is an important defect, as it makes the police force predominantly Arab and Moslem. There

was a time, before the Balfour Declaration was made good, when Arab mobs were induced to murder Jews, and the police force on that occasion used their rifles with less impartiality than was becoming. But 1921 is a long time ago, and now the police are, for the most part, unarmed; while the Jews, let it be said, are better prepared and in a position to hit back.

Public Works

The third unquestioned gain was the roads, enabling the fellah to get his produce to market. I suppose the fellah thinks they are good roads; but the head of the Public Works Department has not his heart in motoring. When roads are "up" in Palestine—and all are—cars have to turn off along the veldt; to the passenger the change is hardly noticeable. When a road goes up a mountain in Palestine—and all do—it climbs by zigzags, each about 50 yards long. The innumerable hairpin bends are suitable, no doubt, for camels and donkeys, but a motor car or bicyclist would prefer 500 yards in the straight. But perhaps these donkey-roads are of Turkish manufacture, like the donkeys. British cars are not built for Palestine, and they have as yet no agent there. However, we have built many roads in Palestine, and even the Romans could not have made them straight.

Nor do they always wait for the forces of the P.W.D. The Assistant District Commissioners are making roads too, without bothering officialdom about it. They are making them in the old artless pioneer fashion, by "jollying" the people into doing it for themselves. There is a great deal to be said for District Commissioners, but as this chapter is critical I must leave it unsaid.

One obvious road problem in Palestine is vexing likewise every administration throughout the Empire.

Ought roads to parallel railways? The railways got there first; they join the towns; they want all the traffic they can get; and they are generally the property of the State. If the State builds trunk roads it cuts its own traffic to bits. One and a half hours takes one by road from Jaffa to Jerusalem—three hours by train. The railway, bought from the French at a political and not an econonic price, has cut the competing fare to the bone, but still the motor will do it almost as cheaply. It is probably a mistake to prop up the railways as we propped up the canals eighty years ago. One cannot keep back the tide for ever; sooner or later a road must run from Jaffa to Haifa, and delay will only hinder development. As in any case the Haifa-Damascus railway does not belong to the State, it is difficult to see why that railway should not be paralleled by a road through all the prosperous Jewish colonies in the Emek. But the roads, like many other State functions in Palestine, take little account of the Jews.

From an Englishman's point of view the most satisfactory feature in Palestine is finance. In three years the Treasurer has produced order out of chaos, and Great Britain has ceased to be called upon to pay. Palestine pays its way, and they pay interest on the debt to England—a substantial matter which other Crown Colonies involved in the War have failed to liquidate. This has only been possible by the absence of an army, by the influx of Jewish capital, and by rigid economy. To the determination to balance the Budget must be ascribed a certain penuriousness in the administration. For instance, the High Commissioner lives in a hired monastery, and the Government offices are in another hired building. We have built nothing except a few police stations and Customs houses; nor has any work been started on Jaffa or Haifa harbours.

For all these things, and many others, the British Parliament has authorised a loan and has guaranteed the interest ; but the loan has never been floated, and the harbour is not begun. Now, at a time of exceptional unemployment both here and in Palestine, it would surely be right to get moving. It is not statesmanship to jeer at the Zionist organisation, saying, " We told you so ; we warned you to reduce immigration." Statesmanship means helping the country to tide over the bad time even by accelerating the expenditure of loan money on essential public works.

Crown Lands

Above all, a Milner or a Cromer would insist that derelict and unused land be placed at the disposal of those who wished to work. When we took over the Mandate it was assumed, probably rightly, that much of Palestine was Crown land which the Jews could lease from the Crown. But gradually, as the demand for land grew, as civilisation brought law and law created title, less and less land was found without a claimant owner. Government officials, uncoached in protecting the interests of the Crown, seem to have protected the interests of native property owners. They accepted as genuine claims which the Turks would have laughed at, and Crown lands became private property for all time—only, this private property remains still unused.

The case of the Beisan Lands is typical. They are a swampy 30,000 acres in the Jordan Valley, south of the Sea of Galilee. Bedouin grazed there nomadically in the winter time. The Jews wanted land which they could drain and lease from the Government, so Government looked into the matter and made a " settlement." Native rights were to be preserved. Directly the inquiry started, the Bedouin rushed in and claimed the lot. Their claims were welcomed, granted royally, and

Sir Herbert Samuel's excellent intentions have ended in Arab titles to excessive and untilled lands, while none is left for the Crown to lease to Jews. It is not only the Jews who have been defrauded in the " settlement," but the Crown and the whole community who would have benefited by greater production and less malaria. Government officials congratulated themselves on this result ; this shows how far religious prejudice can displace the natural instincts of Englishmen. Indeed, without any religious prejudice at all, when the cadastral survey is finished, affection for private property in land will leave as Crown property just the tops of some mountains and little else.

Antiquities

The most valuable of Palestinian imports ought surely to be tourists. It is true that tourists " spoil the native " ; possibly they are vulgar ; a large proportion are German-American-Jews, and that name unites a good many of the pet aversions of suburban Englishmen. But all other countries welcome tourists and lay themselves out for the harvest—though they may laugh in their sleeves at the crop. They find that visitors pay. For all that attracts tourists Palestine should beat the world ! But Egypt is a rival in the tourist business, and Egypt holds the door ; they make it difficult and expensive to get through the door into the Holy Land. A Palestinian Government that desired tourist business would open another door at Haifa or Jaffa, or at a British-controlled Port Fuad on the Canal.

As for the antiquities, the sacred shrines are, of course, well looked after, though not quite as they used to look when the Child was born in Bethlehem. And every corner of the country, every name, is more familiar to the Anglo-Saxon Bible reader than the

county of Surrey. Ruins are in Government charge. They have scheduled each and put a barbed wire fence round it. A considerable charge of 10 piastres a head is made for getting through the barbed wire, and is collected by the custodian who speaks no European language; but, fortunately, the barbed wire is often broken down and the custodian can sometimes be avoided.

On the other hand, the hospices and hotels throughout Palestine are excellent; the motors and drivers beyond compare; begging is less persistent than in Spain or Egypt; and the country is perfectly safe for a man to wander through alone. When the crowds who now winter in Egypt begin to winter instead in the superior climate of Palestine, the finances of that country will cease to be a cause of worry. But the creation of the new Palestine does not depend on attracting the rich for a holiday; creation depends on encouraging the men with Western minds to work the land and build upon it a permanent home. The tourist will bring grist to the Government's mill, but I wish that the Secretariat knew more clearly what England and the Jews expect them to grind out of the mill.

CHAPTER III

CONSTRUCTIVE

CRITICISM will never carry conviction unless there be constructive suggestions made at the same time. Let me attempt the task. The first reform required in Palestinian government is that there should be a definite policy, settled at home, and conveyed to the Secretariat in Jerusalem. What is the long view taken by the Secretary of State and Cabinet of what they desire to achieve in Palestine ? I presume the ultimate goal is, as I have suggested, a Seventh Dominion. I can think of no other ; any Crown colony government in Palestine must inevitably be transitory. The only alternatives to Dominion home rule are (1) separation, and (2) the surrender of the Mandate to another Power. Neither of these is conceivably British policy, therefore it must be Dominion home rule. But it may be an Arab state, similar in character to Ceylon ; or it may be a Jewish state, similar to New Zealand ; in either case with a very large minority of the other race. It must not be Egypt.

Before any constructive policy can be devised the British Government must make up their minds which of the two Dominions they want to visualise for the future. We cannot really hesitate between these two alternatives, for we must not break our word to the Jews. Here is the British pledge, known as the Balfour Declaration :—

> H.M. Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate

> the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.

If our Jewish Dominion is to prejudice the rights of the Arab population, then, indeed, we might doubt. If the two sides of the pledge were incompatible, then, indeed, Lord Balfour must be knave or fool, and we must be dishonoured. But civilisation is quite compatible with well-being and justice for natives. One might point to the African West Coast Colonies, for instance ; I would point to Ceylon. It can be done, though I admit it is not easy or common. We are getting to know perfectly how it can be done. The land must not be taken away from the native so that he can no longer employ himself by producing from the soil ; nor must he be compelled to work for the planters of a higher civilisation by demands to pay a money poll tax, or by the pressure of officials upon village headmen. These considerations have been observed and can be contracted for in Palestine. Long before that contract can be infringed the two civilisations will have merged in one.

For the fact is that the Arabs have obviously benefited by the arrival of the Jews ; their surroundings and culture are already higher, and nothing need prevent coalescence. The town Arab worker of to-day is striding in seven league boots from the sixteenth to the twentieth century. The fellaheen are sharing in the same advance ; their land is not taken away, and they share in the free example and instruction of the new world in which they now live. It is regrettable that the fellaheen have not profited from our stay in Egypt, but in Palestine the new infusion of Jews has already done more than the British occupation effected in Egypt in forty-five years.

So that we may carry out the terms of the Mandate with a clear conscience. The pertinent clause runs as follows :—

> Article II. The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home . . . and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine.

We can, in strict accord with this clause, immigrate the Jews until the higher civilisation is numerous and wise enough to make democracy safe for all ; and then we can count upon the new democracy to range up beside the other self-governing dominions. The safe policy, the policy obviously most profitable to the world, is also the right policy. The Jews do not injure but benefit the Arabs ; we want capable and civilised friends for members of the British Union, and we can therefore honourably aim at creating a Jewish Seventh Dominion.

We may therefore take it for granted that the British Government, whether Conservative or Labour, has as its object in Palestine the ultimate establishment there of a Jewish Dominion within the British Empire or Union. I think they ought also to estimate the number of years that such a development should take. I imagine that it will take a generation, and that no intermediate step is necessary or desirable. We may learn from Cyprus on that point—Cyprus, where we went too fast.

The first step to put matters right would be, as we have seen, for the Secretary of State to lay down the goal and the general line and period of advance, and to inform the Palestinian Secretariat accordingly.

They cannot really be blamed for having no policy if they have not had such information.

The next step would be to start co-operation with the Jews, Government and Zionist Executive, in order to secure the successful colonisation of Palestine by Jews. The Secretariat must try to imagine that they are settling British unemployed in Palestine—a patriotic task to be helped whole-heartedly. Let them make helpful suggestions to the Zionists, as though they were making suggestions to the British Government about British unemployed ; let them make loans help to find land, and stock, and fruit trees, take a pride in the success of the colonies. In a word, allow their success or failure to be judged by the success or failure of Jewish colonisation. An obvious element in any such success must be the elevation of the Arab masses to Jewish standards of civilisation.

In order to secure this co-operation in the colonisation of Palestine a branch of the Administration, with an important minister at its head, should take over colonisation work. This minister should do the work that the Secretariat now leaves to the Zionist Agency. He should have his land settlement bank to make advances and secure payments ; he should have his machinery for acquiring land, for building, for stocking, etc., on loan ; he should have his nursery plantations and research stations, unless the Director of Agriculture can serve the agricultural needs of both Arab and Jew. He should be such a man as Sir John Campbell has proved himself to be in Greece. What is required is that the Secretariat should show active co-operation by taking on the work that in any other country is done by Government—work which, unfortunately both for Jews and English, they have hitherto left to the Zionists.

The Zionists have not done the work particularly well, but because the Jews were willing to do this work,

and to pay for it themselves, therefore, hitherto, the Secretariat have not unnaturally been content to allow the growth of this *imperium in imperio*. It is just this easy *désintéressement*, this lack of responsibility, which has made them into a mere Government of Arabs in Palestine, a community affair which is both humiliating to us and fatal to the creation of common interests in Palestine.

Officials, in fact, are only human beings. If it is their business to do a job of work, if they will get the credit of success, if it is their mark that is to be made on Palestine and Empire, then they will take a live interest in it and do it well. If the Jews are doing it instead, it becomes natural for officials to say : " Very well, let them make a mess of it, and discover that only English officials have a genius for Empire building." The English, in fact, want the responsibility *and* the credit ; the Jews want the work done and do not mind who gets the credit. They are extraordinarily like Englishmen ; they never mind who works for them.

So that, for purely psychological reasons, an official department should take on the work of settlement if there is to be real and successful co-operation. Indeed, the Zionists cannot do much more, and there are great patches of their work which are becoming demonstrably bad. For instance, by now there ought to have been a beginning of the repayment of advances to settlers. There has been little or none, and so long as the advances come from charitable sources repayments are difficult to enforce. Charity breeds dependence and destroys self-reliance. A State, especially an autocratic State, can be more hard-hearted. The business of settling hundreds of thousands of ignorant people upon the land cannot remain a matter for amateurs. The colonists require skilled supervision and advice on the spot, less praise and propaganda.

Raising funds is a different matter from spending the funds wisely—an easier matter. Settlement *en masse* is a big affair, and everywhere else it is a matter for Government. There will be work enough left for Keren Kayemeth and Keren Hayesod.

The Settlement Department will require funds ; it may require a loan secured upon both the revenues of Palestine and the lands acquired. As we have provided £10,000,000 for the almost identical purpose of settling Greek refugees in Greece, secured in the same way upon the million acres of land and upon the revenues of Greece, and as this work in Greece has been successfully carried out by an Englishman trained in the Indian Civil Service it cannot be beyond the wit of Government to achieve similar beneficent results inside the British Empire.[1] Moreover, the Jews of the world would gladly take our place in subscribing the capital required for a loan so well secured.

I would add that the despised, but apparently wide-awake, Government of the U.S.S.R. is also doing precisely the same service for the Russian Jews in the Ukraine and Crimea—finding land for them, loans, cheap transport, forest timber for building—in order that they may settle in Russia and become a strength to Russia, instead of settling in Palestine and becoming a strength to the hated British Empire. They have already planted 50,000 refugee Jews from the towns upon the land ; turned 50,000 middlemen into valuable producers.[2] " Where there's a will, there's a way," and the British Government should acquire the will and find the way if they value their reputation in the world.

In order to obtain the land required for settlement at a reasonable price a concurrent constructive reform would be the change of taxation implied in the abolition of Tithe and the present Wergo. It seems to be the

[1] See Chapter VIII. [2] See Chapter IX.

intention of the Secretariat, "at the proper time," to substitute for these mediævalisms, taxes upon land value or upon the dunam (¼ acre), and the sooner reforms upon these lines become law instead of good intentions the better for those who want to use land. One might point out that such a reform need not wait for the completion of the cadastral survey; that survey might be made district by district, and the change in the standard of taxation made district by district as completed, so universally is the change desired.

And, if the Secretariat earnestly desire to find land for Jewish colonisation, they will find enough to go on with, some in Palestine and more in Transjordania. Governments can expropriate and compensate, at least in Eastern climes, with more equity and despatch than can private corporations. Some land in Transjordania has already been conceded to an Englishman who is cultivating the land, and who, although he is in a minority, is managing to hold his own against the nomad Bedouin. If the principle be accepted that the use of land for agriculture must be preferred to its use for nomadic grazing, then the more settlers who go to Transjordania prepared to defend themselves the better for the spread of civilisation. Palestine seven years ago was as unsafe as Transjordania is to-day; Oregon in 1848 was more unsafe.

Besides taking over from the Zionist Organisation the work of colonising, an end should be made of our present custom of leaving the Jews outside the pale of Government.[1] Education and health services are a

[1] At present the State servants of the three communities are divided as follows:—

	Christian	*Moslem*	*Jew*
£200 to £400 a year . .	273	85	151
£401 to £800 a year . .	172	55	38
Over £800 a year . .	63	2	3

The Christians are mostly Syrian Christians.

matter for the central Government, whether those to be educated or healed are Christian, Moslem or Jew. By leaving them in water-tight compartments we foster the community spirit. The raising of the fellaheen to the higher civilisation of Jew or Christian depends on the destruction, not on the fostering, of this caste spirit.

But now Jews, fearing all Governments, insist that that they should find their own education, and the Government is naturally indifferent as to its nature. Jews find their own doctoring and sanitary services ; immigration hostels are left to the Jews. Even the roads seem laid out as though Jew colonies did not exist and only Arab villages were of interest to the Government. The Jews have now been granted the power to tax themselves (in addition to paying the State taxes)—a deplorable importation from the European diaspora. So that a desirable constructive reform would be that each Department of State should ask for and welcome the responsibility over Jews that it already has over the other elements ; should exercise its responsibility as though the Jewish population were just as helpless as the Arabs. Then the Jews too would feel more sensibly their responsibility towards the State and their weaker neighbours. The rivalry would die down.

Of course, the Jews may refuse any such co-operation, but it is unlikely. For not only is the cost of all these services heavy, but amateurs do not perform all the services well. Their agricultural research is excellent, and so is their health service, managed almost entirely by the women of the Hadassah. But the direction of agriculture in the colonies is not in the hands of, or under the supervision of, practical experts ; and their school teachers are far from reaching modern standards. Women inspectors of schools are conspicuous by their

absence, a special Zionist failing. They are always afraid that Government, like all the Governments they have known, will try to eliminate their particularisms, especially their Hebrew language. They can hardly conceive of a Government as a friend. Jews only ask Christian Governments to let them alone for fear of what a Christian Government may do. Moslems have more faith that we should not dare to proselytise.

Of all labour reforms (and many of these are long overdue) by far the most important is that Government should pay for manual labour wages upon which the higher civilisation can live. This may be more expensive, but it is essential to the success of Jewish immigration, and it would be also of incalculable benefit to the Arabs. Only so can the standard of the Arabs be brought up to the Jewish level and the Arab race be saved from sinking to that of so many natives in white planter-colonies. In no possible way can our duty to the natives of Palestine be better performed. The Government is by far the greatest employer of labour ; the tone and standard set by Government inevitably bring other employers into line.

While all the preceding reforms are both necessary and obviously practical ; while, indeed, the reforms in taxation would meet most of the additional charges involved in the improved administration, my next constructive suggestion may be less necessary and practical. It seems to me that English administrative capacity and honesty are not being adequately used. The Colonial Office young man from Cambridge or Oxford is the best material in the world. In Palestine this material is being wasted on measuring and assessing stacks of forage. Is it not possible even now to make these Assistant District Commissioners into Resident Magistrates, with responsibility within their area for all the Government departments ?

Resident magistrates need not be lawyers. Of those made by Lord Milner in South Africa none that I can remember was a lawyer. Sir Richard Solomon, the Attorney-General, told me on my appointment that it was more important that I should learn the language than the law, while Lord Milner's parting words were, "Go straight, and keep them happy."

The painful evidence of corruption among the native Palestinian magistrates, the elimination of the Tithe with its laborious crop assessments occupying all the time of the Commissioners, the development of local self-government where guidance in the initial stages is so important, the construction of roads which must so largely be done by inducement, above all, the team spirit required to bring all the administration officials into the collar, all these could be met if English Assistant District Commissioners had delegated to them the powers which they have proved elsewhere that they can use so well. I noticed at Tel Aviv (the Jewish township of 43,000 souls which possesses a complete autonomy) that the Jew Labour mayor relied for advice and all assistance upon the District Commissioner, Major Campbell. That is the right relationship, a relationship which increased status for the Assistant Commissioner would establish everywhere, to the immense benefit of progress and public spirit in Palestine.

Or take education. One of the most distressing features in Palestine education is the ignorance of the teachers of the English language. I had to talk French in the Nazareth High School. It would not so much matter were it not that the Moslem and Christian parents want, above all, that their children should learn English, so that they might get educationally on to the level of the Jews. It is obvious that in many of the towns—Nablus, Hebron, Bethlehem, Tiberias,

Nazareth, Safed—the people would be prepared to pay at least part of the salary of an English headmaster or headmistress, and there must be many of our best teachers who would gladly have a year in the Holy Land to start the right sort of education. It is not even lonely, for with a motor-cycle any one can get anywhere at any time. Excessively Christian teachers would have to be avoided, but it is only where proselytising can be suspected that trouble with Moslems need be anticipated. In fact, it would be good to disabuse the Arab mind of the impression that all English education must come through the mouths of missionaries.

Other reasons make it desirable that there should be some degree-giving institution in Palestine. The Jews have their university; for the others there is no university, no college. Those Christians or Moslems who wish to take up a professional career must go to Beyrout, in French Syria, or to Europe, for their education and degree. For them the Jewish University is quite useless, as all the teaching is carried on in Hebrew. Except for the law, no vocational training of any sort can be obtained in Palestine. Owing to the absence of any such British institution in the Levant, the polite language, even in Palestine, has become Levantine French. The Christians of Bethlehem and Nazareth speak French till they go to America; British officials try to speak it; and more Jews speak French than English.

The Jews also, whether in their elementary or higher schools, learn little or no English, and again, so I was assured, the lack of English-speaking teachers is to blame. By the absurd convention which divorces the government of the Jews from the government of the country, the Minister for Education has no control over or interest in Jews and their education. A small sum

is paid over annually by the Government to the Zionist organisation to help their schools, but the conduct and financing of those schools is left entirely to the Zionist body. The result is not good, but I do not think anything else could be expected from an institution relying mostly on charity. Just as the Arab schools could get some teachers from England, so I believe the Jewish schools could get teachers from among the Jewesses of America or England who would speak English, and like to learn and teach in Hebrew. For them, too, a year or two in one of the wonderful colonies of their race would be an attraction not to be measured solely by salary. One need hardly say that Jews are quite as anxious as Arabs to learn English as a second language, for one quarter of their race are already in America, and the text-books available are mostly in our language.

It will be seen that, apart from financial reform, all depends on "taking over" the Jews. The present system of "keeping the ring" for the Jews and letting them do their best or worst by themselves (and pay twice over) has got to come to an end. Charitable Jews will not stand it much longer, for it is so obviously unfair and slighting. The Government must take as much interest in this intellectually important element of the population as they do in the Arab majority. The separate community idea must cease. That such a system has grown up is not wholly or perhaps mainly the fault of the Government. All over Europe, except in Great Britain, the Jews form more or less an alien community among the Gentiles, governing and taxing themselves. It has become natural to them to continue this "alien community," even in their own homeland. It springs from the habit of never expecting justice or equal rights, but, when once developed, it excuses any Government from supplying equal rights.

" Even if you tax your own people to supply your own hospitals and schools and paupers, we cannot exempt you from paying the ordinary taxes to supply these needs for the whole community." So Governments in Europe and Palestine seem to say, and all one can complain of is that the Palestinian Government too readily, and probably through ignorance, adopted the Continental instead of the English view. Fortunately, the increasing financial strain upon the Zionist body will force a reconsideration of this system from their side. The whole-hearted adoption by the Government of the proposed new Department to help the settlement and immigration of Jews would be a fitting close to the period and practice of " *désintéressement.*" I do not believe that such an enterprise as the Jews have undertaken in Palestine can be successful without Government aid and co-operation. The voluntary subscriptions of enthusiasts at a distance suffice to show what can be done; but the carrying through must, in these modern days, depend upon a Government machine, capable of helping with caution and of recovering debts on business lines. While the Greeks are doing this in Greece and the Russians for the Jews in Russia it is a slur upon our common sense to suppose that we cannot, if we will, do the work in Palestine.

CHAPTER IV

COMMUNAL REPRESENTATION IN THE EMPIRE

If we are to make a success of Palestine the three peoples there must grow together, acquiring common interests and a common public opinion. Probably the most fatal obstacle in the way of such development, in Palestine as elsewhere, is what is known as communal representation. A national public spirit and communal representation are incompatible. It is therefore worth while to consider the history, methods and results of communal representation throughout our experimental Empire. From that Palestine may learn.

By communal representation we mean the division of the electorate into two or more lists, according to community, race or religion ; and the election from the community lists, and by those on the community lists, of representatives of each community. The elected member then represents his community, is responsible to them alone, solicits their votes only at election time, and tends to be guided, not by the interests of the public but by the interests of the community. The normal alternative is the British system of a common roll of electors, electing a member responsible to all in a localised constituency, asking all religions and races for their vote, tending to be guided by the general interest of the locality.

One method accentuates the special community, the other the locality ; as securing the public interest, neither is perfect. More perfect in theory should be proportional representation where the larger consti-

tuency dwarfs the locality, and the public interest can replace both the sect and the parish pump. Proportional representation requires, however, an educated electorate, able to read and select without personal contact with the candidates. Personal knowledge of the candidate is of far greater importance with primitive electorates, so that the very large constituencies required for proportional representation, make that system unsuitable as a first stage in the development of a taste for democracy.

There remain for the Dominions-to-be the alternatives of the community roll, or the common roll, and the former is often, though I think inadvisedly, chosen by a community which is in a minority for its own better protection. It is often chosen by a Government as the way of peace, and it is sometimes selected by reluctant autocrats surrendering power, as the best way to surrender and yet continue to rule. It was selected in Kenya because the white majority (electoral) objected to any white candidate demeaning himself by asking a coloured man for his vote—as indicating equality of the races, a common roll was abhorrent to them.

This question of community or common roll, which was unmasked and unconsidered only ten years ago, is now the supreme subject of debate throughout the Empire wherever the development of democracy is taking place. India is rent in two; there is not a Hindoo who is not for the common roll; there is not a Mohammedan who does not count the community roll the one safeguard of his faith. They battle for the souls of Sikhs, Mahrattas, and non-Brahmins who have not yet made up their minds. Lampoons and satires [1], from

[1] As for instance :—

" Extract from the Report of the Administration of Jails in the Bombay Presidency, 1926.

" In spite of every precaution the numbers in the jails did not

Cape Cormorin to the Himalayas, show every railway porter and sweeper selected on a community rota. Every appointment is scrutinised solely from that point of view. In Kenya it nearly caused secession from the British Empire. In Ceylon it broke up the National Congress. In South Africa the natives are making their last desperate stand against the destruction of the common roll in Cape Colony and against the proffered substitution of community representation. While in England, so ignorant are we of the meaning of the new supreme question, that we associate communal representation with Moscow and impropriety !

So in due course of time, far away from a world storming over communal representation, a Committee of well-intentioned officials sat round a table in Jerusalem to devise self-government for the cities of Palestine. Completely ignorant of all that had gone before, they tied round the neck of Palestine, in complete innocence, the millstone of the communal roll. Nobody asked for it, nobody wanted it; they just thought it was best, and even deny that it is communal representation at all. It is possible that if one could explain what communal representation means and what it leads to one might yet enable these well-intentioned officials to change their minds before they devise self-government for the whole of Palestine.

There has never been communal representation in Great Britain from 1264 till the present day. From

correspond to the quotas fixed for each community. The Superintendent had already asked for instruction from Government with a view to remedy the discrepancy.

" Resolution of Government: ' Government view with serious displeasure this grave dereliction of duty on the part of the Inspector-General of Prisons. Immediate steps should be taken to arrest and put in jail as many members of the various communities as are required to bring their quotas up to the proper level. If enough persons required cannot be caught, a sufficient number of inmates should be let off to bring down all to the same level.' "

1885 till 1922 the Protestants in Southern Ireland were a swamped minority with no direct representation in Parliament—they who before had ruled; but they never thought of asking for communal representation or a communal roll of electors which might give them at least one Member from the South of Ireland. From 1828 to the present day there is only one constituency in England (Scotland division of Liverpool) where the Catholics have a majority of votes on the common roll. But they have never asked for a community roll which would give them forty safe seats in Parliament; they understood politics too well to believe that their minority views could thus be safeguarded; they prefer to hold an uncertain vote and a certain power in the election to 400 seats. Would the Jews think of asking for a communal roll and the three seats to which they would be entitled in Parliament? They would regard being put upon a communal roll and excluded from the common roll as an insult intended to do them an injury.

Communal representation presupposes afar higher development of the caste system than ever existed in England. On the Continent of Europe it would be more possible. One can imagine the Jewish community asking for it in Austria, and the further east, the more they, or any other minority, might ask for it. For the further east one goes, the less faith there is in representation and democracy. In the old Austrian Empire communal representation was evolved with their nineteenth-century Parliamentary institutions, especially in Moravia and Galicia—Pole and Czech and German became ever more furiously Pole and Czech and German till the Empire burst into fragments.

Great Britain's first lapse was in 1867, when communal representation was given to the Maoris in New Zealand. New Zealand had been given representative

institutions a dozen years before ; something had to be done for the Maoris. It was too much to expect them to be treated quite on a par with whites, so they were given the vote on a communal roll and allowed to elect four Members to the Parliament at Wellington. As the ordinary New Zealand legislator has no Maori voters, he is not likely to do very much to help the native ; as there are only four native representatives, they can easily be rendered powerless. Since most of the Maoris are congregated locally in the North Island their position in politics would not be much better if they had votes on the common roll ; but their cousins in Hawaii have votes on the common roll in common with all other American citizens, and they are fast acquiring the attitude of mind as well as the manner of speech of the other Free and Equal American Citizens. The psychological effect of being on a common roll (instead of being set in a caste apart) is considerable, quite outside politics.

When fixing the franchise for Cape Colony in 1853 the natives and the half-castes were given votes on the common roll of electors, and up till now, alone in the South African Union, the natives of the Cape still hold their right to vote. They cannot be elected, but the fact that they can choose which white man to vote for procures them consideration. In no constituency are they in a majority, but there are a handful of native votes in many constituencies, and in the struggles of the South African parties this handful is often of importance. Their suffrage has to be sought, their wishes considered ; some slight protection is thus afforded them. But, because it is undignified for a white man to ask a native for a vote, because the common roll treats white and black alike, therefore, now in 1927, legislation is proposed to end the common roll and to establish a communal franchise. If the

natives will only accept the abolition of the common roll in the Cape, they are offered community representation in all the States of the Union—in the Transvaal, Free State, German South-West, and Natal—where to-day they have no votes at all. It speaks well for the intelligence of the Transvaal native that he would rather all the natives of the Transvaal remained completely voteless than that his more lucky cousins in the Cape should lose their place of honour—and some safety—on the common roll. They know well the amount of "protection" afforded to the weak by communal representation. They know it as well as do the Indians of Kenya.

Then, in 1882, the Colonial Office inflicted the communal roll on Cyprus. Evidently they did it with the best intentions. Earl Grey claimed it as an admirable example of proportional representation :—

> The census taken in 1881 revealed the fact that one-quarter of the people were Mohammedan. Now, wishing to secure fair representation, what did the Government do? Did they divide the island into twelve districts each returning one member? No; they knew that such a course would be grossly unfair to the Mohammedans.

And he goes on to advocate the Cyprus system for England, ignorant apparently of the two separate communal rolls of electors. The Cyprus system divides the island into three constituencies each returning four members. There are two rolls of electors, Mohammedan and Christian, and the Mohammedans elect a Mohammedan in each constituency, and the Christians elect three Christians in each constituency. The Government, with six officials on the Legislative Council, can always just manage to get their way if Mohammedan and Christian disagree. It becomes the

Government interest that they should disagree; and they have disagreed ever since, to the exasperation of everybody. How much better would it have been if the Government had trusted to English traditions and practice. Then the religions would have been brought together by the desire to please the general electorate; and, till that was proved to be the case, some nominated Mohammedan members would have reassured the minority. Nominated members create no vested interest, and in the end the elected and electors will prove that they can do without them.

Just at the same time that the Colonial Office was establishing trouble for all time in Cyprus, Lord Ripon was doing his best to get the sound English practice established in India. He set up his municipalities and district boards, a reform comparable only to the Reforms of 1919. Much excellent precedent for our Colonial Empire appears in these foundations of Indian local government. They enquired diligently into methods of election—" the simple vote, the cumulative vote, election by wards, election for the whole town or tract, suffrage of more or less extended qualification, elections by castes or occupations." The general function of the executive officers (district magistrates) was to be—to guide, check, and inform the elected body, generally as chairmen. The inquiry produced the following :—

> It was not thought desirable to " introduce representation and voting by guilds, castes, or sects, as this might in some places foster rivalries and prejudices which the present policy, if it succeeds in bringing together the representatives of the general community on the common ground of civic interests and local responsibility, may very much help to obliterate.

On that principle, the Act of 1882 was passed, and to that principle the Indian Government adhered in Act

after Act in spite of all pressure till local government became in 1919 a provincial transferred subject. Then the nominated element on the municipalities and district boards, securing some minority representation, gradually died out. Members were nearly all elected, and various sorts of communal representation became the rule.

Communal feeling, the antagonism of Hindoo to Mohammedan and Mohammedan to Hindoo, has prevented the success of local administration and is the despair of all Indian patriots. It has been increased by this communal representation. Under various local Acts many municipalities and district boards have now separate electorates of Mohammedans and non-Mohammedans who elect to the boards communal representatives varying with the proportion of the Mohammedan population, and slightly weighted in favour of the Mohammedans where the latter are in the minority. Since the Mohammedans in town are mostly poor, and in some small towns the number of this community who pay rates and have votes is inconsiderable, the result is sometimes curious. Sir S. H. Freemantle quoted one town where five voters elect three members of the Board.

The Mohammedans had been pressing for special representation ever since 1909 in connection with the Morley-Minto Reforms. Having secured a precedent in the Municipalities Act of 1916, they pressed forward to the Legislative Assembly. At the National Congress of 1916, the Hindoo nationalists, in order to secure national unity, accepted the Mohammedan demand, and so the communal roll and the communal members of the legislatures were embodied in the Montagu-Chelmsford Constitution on the united demand of the whole Indian people. If the Indian people had known more surely what sort of British officials were support-

ing this communal representation they might have seen better the dangers they were running by this fatal concession to the hope of Indian unity.

As the Mont-ford Reforms proceeded on their leisurely way towards the Statute Book, each sect in turn came forward with claims based on the Mohammedan precedent. They all got their way, till the very idea of India vanished from the Government of India Bill to be replaced by the joint and disunited communities of Hindoo, Mohammedan, Sikh, Mahratta, non-Brahmin, Indian Christian, Anglo-Indian and English. And now the very posts on the railways and the Customs are rationed out according to the community rota, while engineers and doctors are selected not by knowledge, but by faith. Confidence, public spirit and co-operation have been banished from the State, and confined to the community.

The method of obtaining community representation in India varies. So far as Mohammedans, Sikhs (in the Punjab), Indian Christians (in Madras), Anglo-Indians and Europeans, were concerned, separate rolls of electors were prepared. The electors on these rolls might only vote for one of themselves. All the rest of the sects and races were on a further separate roll, predominantly Hindoo. Each province was divided up into a series of separate constituencies—for Hindoo, Mohammedan and Sikh. The constituency for Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians and Europeans, was generally the entire province. In Burma alone were the electors allowed to vote for a candidate outside their race, and there one constituency actually elects an Englishman by Burmese votes.

This is, of course, the extreme form of communal representation. For the Mahratta and non-Brahmin a milder method was devised. Constituencies were made very large, as large as for proportional representation,

returning three or four members, and it was stipulated that at least one or more of these members should be Mahratta or non-Brahmin, however few votes the leading candidates of that race or creed should obtain. But there were no separate rolls of electors for those creeds or races. This is a milder form of communalism, akin to proportional representation, chiefly objectionable on account of the enormous size of the constituencies which prevents any member being able to become acquainted with his electors. The Outcastes, Adi-Dravidas or Sudhras, are still represented by nomination ; but they too are clamouring for their separate rolls of electors. There is some talk of meeting in the same way the claims of the Jains and the Gonds and the more primitive tribes of the Bombay hills whose habits are known and peculiar.

It is not too much to say that the British rulers of India who for various reasons accepted in 1919 the communal demands of the Mohammedans stand aghast at later developments. They opened the floodgates, and now all posts—all—from the seats on the councils and on the supreme court to the sub-postmaster at Footlipore, have become the perquisites of some special creed and the subject-matter of religious hatred. Therefore when the Colonial Office approached the problem of the Ceylon Constitution in 1922 communal representation was better known and more feared. The Colonial Office, chiefly under the guidance of Major Ormsby Gore, found a rather better way out.

Ceylon possesses the following discordant communities, all having leaders with political aspirations, and all except the majority demanding communal representation—British planters and merchants, Burghers of Dutch semi-parentage, Singhalese of two rival and mutually contemptuous castes, Kandians, Moors or Mohammedan traders, Tamils of Ceylon, and Tamil

coolies from India. Here was obviously a better opportunity for " queering the pitch for democracy," for " divide and rule " than was presented by India itself. The Tamils of North Ceylon might have played the part taken by the Mohammedans in India ; they are a similarly virile race despising the more prosperous low-country Singhalese. The Moors had been pogromised by the Singhalese during the War. The Kandians had been free and independent in the Highlands for 300 years, while the Singhalese were acquiring Portuguese names and British culture. They despised the lot, and feared their superior education. All demanded communal representation, except the low-country Singhalese—the majority. These low-country Singhalese fortunately were prepared to make any sacrifice to avoid splitting Ceylon as India had been split.

As a result in Ceylon they have one common roll of electors and single-member constituencies ; but the minorities have double votes. That is to say, the British, the Burghers, the Moors and the Tamils of the Western Province, have all two votes, one on the common roll for the representatives of the people, and one on their own communal roll for their own community representatives. They are represented twice over, and the Singhalese accepted this rather than lose the common roll of electors and the community of national interest that springs therefrom. The result has been that there is no communal representation at all on municipalities and district boards, that communal feeling has died down and national feeling is growing, and yet that Crown colony government gets along better than in India and with the respect of the governed.

In these post-war years representative institutions spread widely over the Empire, especially in the field

of local government. The common roll was adopted everywhere, though in most cases communities differed and despised each other as much as in India or Cyprus or Ceylon. Hongkong, Malaya, Mauritius, Southern Rhodesia, the West Indies, British Guiana, Ireland, all have the common roll. That Shanghai and the settlements have not, is one of the causes of the trouble in China. And in Kenya they have not got the common roll, and the reason thereof has become notorious.

With the experience of India and Ceylon before them the Colonial Office knew that the communal roll was definitely bad. In the long debates with the India Office over the grievances of Indians in Kenya it was chiefly the swamping of the European vote by the Indian vote that the Colonial Office sought to prevent. The Wood-Winterton agreement, at which the two offices finally arrived, prevented any swamping of the white electorate, for the proposed franchise required property tests and education tests which should restrict the number of Indian voters to less than one-tenth of the Indian population. In fact, the Indian electors would have been less than one-thirtieth. All these restrictions the Indians consented to for the sake of the common roll of electors—the badge of equality. The European planters on their side were indifferent as to the number of Indians on the Council, provided that there should be separate communal rolls, Indians and Europeans and natives apart—in other words, the colour bar. All else they accepted, but on this common roll they declared war. They refused to accept the Wood-Winterton Agreement, prepared to kidnap the British administration, and to secede from the Empire. Never should a British candidate for the Legislature be seen asking an Indian for a vote; never should an Indian be able to allege that he represented European gentlemen. They won! The George Washingtons of

Naivasha and Nairobi, 2,000 strong, coerced the entire British Empire into breaking the Agreement. And so to-day there are, or should be, four Indian gentlemen on the Legislative Council of Kenya, elected by the communal votes of Indians, and the white gentlemen are still immaculate.

With the experience of New Zealand, Cyprus, India, Ceylon and Kenya behind them the Colonial Office faced the same question of representation in the towns of Palestine. They might have observed that nowhere in the British Empire, save only in India, is there any communal representation on town councils or local authorities. They should have observed that there was no demand for community representation in Palestine. They should have remembered that a precedent set for local elections would make it difficult to change when a Palestinian parliamentary constitution was to be established. They must have known that the Palestinian self-governing town of Tel Aviv, the only existing example of self-government in Palestine,[1] had a common roll of electors and no communal representation. If they observed any of these things they disregarded them. They invented a system of their own—a system delightful to theologians.

It is a system halfway between the monotheism of the common roll and the polytheism of the Indian electorates, a sort of political trinitarianism. There are to be three community rolls of electors—Christian, Mohammedan and Jew—but yet it is to be only one common roll for electing purposes. The total number on the community roll decides the number of that community who *must* be elected; a Christian must only be nominated by Christians, a Jew by Jews, etc.

[1] The township of Tel Aviv, with 45,000 inhabitants, has more complete autonomy than any other city in the British Empire—the result of pure accident and indifference.

(and at least 10 per cent. of the community electors are required for the nomination of any candidate); but, once nominated, there are not three rolls but one roll, and a Christian or a Jew or a Mohammedan may vote for anybody he pleases provided that he has been nominated. British subjects in Palestine may not take part in the game; they may look on and bet on the results. Enjoyable as this scheme is to Englishmen, and annoying as it will be to Palestinians, it may perhaps show a way of escape from the excessive communalism of India. These inventors have certainly hit upon something quite new and religiously attractive, and it might help us to find a way out from worse things.

There is one argument in favour of communal representation: it is generally asked for by the minority afraid of the oppression of a newly enfranchised majority. It is asked for by the Moslem League in India, by the Moslems in Cyprus, by the Tamils in Ceylon; it was supposed to have been asked for by the Kareens in Burma. The Sikhs asked for it in the Punjab in 1919. It was not asked for by the Indians in Kenya, or by the native Africans in South Africa; but in these cases the communal roll was felt to confer a badge of inferiority, and neither Africans nor Indians were really a minority of the inhabitants though they were a minority of the electors. It was not asked for by any one of the three minorities in Palestine.

It may be said with justice that if the minorities ask for this method of election as a protection to themselves, they must know best what is good for themselves, and that, so far as the minority is concerned, should settle the question. But it must be observed that communal election admittedly secures the election of the *leaders* of any community, so that, as the leaders get the seats and the limelight, they, at least, will

always assuredly be in favour of a system of election which must elect them. They are the vocal part of the community; it by no means follows that their election to the council gives the minority the most effective influence upon that council. In this matter we should do well to discount to some extent the personal advantage derived from the prospective possession of a "safe seat."

The arguments against communal election are two: that the minority is helped more by having a few votes in many constituencies rather than many votes in a few constituencies; that communal election puts on the councils the religious extremists whose interest it is to divide, and not the moderate man whose interest it is to unite all his possible supporters.

It is difficult to prove the first point; but the fact is that national and religious minorities, in countries where they have the franchise on the common roll, never ask for communal franchise in place of what they have. This is good evidence that in their opinion the common roll gives the better protection. No Jews nor Catholics nor Protestants have ever asked for communal representation in countries that are democratically governed. They realise that the power of the vote over the deputies is greater than the power of the deputy over the executive. They realise too that it is to their advantage to co-operate with, rather than to antagonise, the majority—to merge themselves in a greater whole, and to colour that whole. Anyone looking at England to-day will realise that the Catholic minority has a moderating influence upon Protestantism in Parliament, that if the Protestant Members of Parliament had no Catholic electors the interests of the Catholic Church, dependent on some forty known Catholic M.P.'s, would often be hard hit. The minority which can sway an election has a dis-

proportionate influence upon the openly expressed views of the elected members of any legislature.

If, by elections on the common roll, no Catholic (or Moslem or Jew) were elected at all, so that no authentic voice of that community could be raised at all in the Council, then indeed it might be desirable that the Government should have power to nominate representatives of those omitted communities Such nomination would allay fears that the special point of view of the community might not be put with sincerity by the ordinary elected representative. We may be sure, from our British experience, that the elected representatives would soon be found able to voice the views of all their constituents; but in a country new to democracy, temporarily at any rate, nomination would quiet some fears and increase confidence in the new Council. That does not alter the fact that in truth the interests of minorities are best protected by having one common roll of electors, which will put a small number of the minority community in each constituency.

There is another way in which we can insure that some at least of any minority community are elected by the common roll. The constituencies may be made sufficiently small and the boundaries so drawn that certain seats will surely be held by the representatives of the minority community. In towns this is done by insisting upon division into wards, more or less homogeneous in character; for a national legislature it is generally sufficient to insist on an adequate number of constituencies. Great Britain with 617 M.P.'s is adequately supplied—the Catholics have at least one safe seat, the Jews a likely one in Whitechapel. Unfortunately, with the object of saving expense, most of the daughter assemblies, legislatures, councils and parliaments have been made too small in the number of their members. The Indian and Ceylon legislatures

are specially small, with the unfortunate result that constituencies are too large and minority communities are generally swamped.

The second main objection to communal representation is that extremists tend to get elected and act, when elected, with ever-increasing communal bitterness. All the electors on each communal roll have one feeling at least common to all on that roll—a common belief in the necessity to defend their race or caste or religion. Anyone seeking their votes will take the line of least resistance and maximum support. Whatever his views may be on economic questions he will be sure to talk community; he will be sure to show that he is the best defender; and when elected he will try to prove that he is the best defender. He will seek occasions to differ from the other communities, and he will work himself up until he is in truth as wrapt up in communal struggles as he has sought to convince his electorate during the heat of an election contest.

Nationalist feeling is strong in India—discipline all too rigid. The Congress Party have been able hitherto to annihilate politically at every election those independents who refused to obey the party. Yet at the last elections both in the Punjab and in the United Provinces the new Hindoo Party of Lajpat Rai and Pandit Maleviya swept the Congress Party away at a breath simply by putting community first. Henceforth in those two provinces the elected representatives of Hindoo and Moslem will glare at each other across the Council table, and any politician who does not detest the rival community will lose his seat. The Moslems may have begun the community business, but the Hindoos have become apt pupils, and all will soon realise that no cure can come till community electorates are abolished.

While we may all of us deplore the fact that the first

step towards self-government brought communal representation into India, yet we cannot alter that fact nor undo it as though it had never been. Laboriously we must find our way out with the consent of the various vested interests that have been created. It will be a long process; but let us at least recognise now the direction in which we should travel. And let us avoid this fatal commitment in other countries where we temporarily guide the people.

CHAPTER V

THE CYPRUS PARALLEL

A HUNDRED miles away, across the water from Palestine, lies the Isle of Cyprus—about as large as Palestine, associated of old with Palestine, alarmingly like Palestine in many ways. It was in 1878 that Disraeli brought back to England from Berlin the Mandate for Cyprus, conferred upon us, not by a League of Nations, but by the Sultan of Turkey. Gifts such as these have a " snag " about them somewhere ; tagged on to the Mandate was the condition of the payment of " tribute " to Turkey—tribute estimated at £92,800 a year. There was nothing about " the development of self-governing institutions " ; it was just " assigned . . . to be occupied and administered by England." There was nothing about " safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants," but the antipathy between the Christian majority and the Moslem minority was more vigorous than between Moslem majority and Jew minority in Palestine.

It was not quite clear who was to pay the tribute ; in fact it never was made clear ; but after thirty years of debate between the Colonial Office, the Treasury and the islanders we decided to go " fifty-fifty," and changed the name from tribute to " the share of Cyprus of the Turkish debt charge." This was only a change of name, since the " tribute " had never reached Turkey, being always absorbed in paying in London the interest on a Turkish loan, which, at the time of the Crimean War, we and the French had been foolish

enough to guarantee. The French Government had no objection so long as they were not called upon to pay. We paid and got what we could from the Cypriots. Now we pay £50,000 a year to English and French bond-holders in the Turkish guaranteed loan, and the rest of the interest is budgeted for each year in Cyprus.

For nearly fifty years, therefore, England has administered this island facing a set of problems almost identical with those that face us in Palestine. We took over from the Turks their land system, their educational system, their taxation, their civil and criminal code. Our tenure was as uncertain in Cyprus as in Palestine, and is so still. Three languages and two races and religions glared at each other. We administered, kept the peace, and remained absolutely neutral. It was not perhaps the fault of the Colonial Office that for thirty years, till 1907, we did nothing. How could administrators do anything when any economy meant more tribute, when any wise expenditure meant a larger grant in aid from the British taxpayer? If government had been absolute, as in Palestine, they could have imposed taxes, made roads, paid for education, improved agriculture. But they were not absolute, the democratic eighties (1882) gave a constitution to Cyprus of just that sort which makes efficiency impossible and democracy irresponsible. Only in 1907 was the grant in aid fixed at £50,000, and the budget of the island made intelligible. To this day the democracy of Cyprus can think of nothing but the injustice of the tribute and union with Greece.

By democracy is meant, of course, the "intelligentsia." Not all Arabs and Syrians of Palestine long for union with greater Arabia; but those do who can get heard, those would who could get elected. So it may be in Cyprus also. An acute observer who knew

his Cyprus well, dealing with this point says: "It is extremely doubtful if in any country the mass of the population, whose horizon is bounded by the necessity of satisfying material wants, is ever deeply stirred by any political considerations save the desire for good government which will ensure them protection, security from oppression, and as light and equitable taxation as possible." Nine Greek Cypriots are elected and three Moslems, and they sit in Council with six British officials and a casting vote, all mutually unintelligible in three languages. The Moslems vote British, vote it blindly, for they fear above all that which Christian compatriots demand—union with Greece. So we administer Cyprus on the casting vote and by grace of the Moslems. Let those who have tried it in Cyprus say whether we should now try to govern Palestine on the casting vote and by grace of the Jews! In all other Crown colonies representative government, as distinguished from responsible government, provides a government majority in the legislature, or gives to the executive the control of the purse as in Ceylon. The constitution of 1882 was premature, excessive and unsuitable. Let us beware of repeating the same mistake in Palestine, for the results have been in all respects bad.

The Constitution of 1882 established communal representation. As everywhere else in the world, this segregation of the castes has destroyed any possibility of common citizenship. East and West are further apart than ever. Politics to Christian and to Moslem alike mean non-co-operation with each other. Fear, hatred and contempt buttress up theology. As the Moslems are perforce on our side, the Greek hatred and contempt extends to the British Government. For forty-five years they have been ever in a minority, ever impotent, ever playing an exasperating farce. No

posts in government are ever theirs. That should surely be enough to sour any politicians. One wonders that they are not more violent, more extreme. One understands that the 66,000 Turks may well be unpopular with, and nervous of, their 260,000 Greek neighbours.

Naturally the only remedy the Greek can see is in union with Greece. Once upon a time we handed the Ionian Isles back to Greece, as there was no Moslem minority there. In 1915 we offered to give Cyprus back to Greece, if only Greece would come and help us in the war, and it seems that Cypriots think we might do it again at any time. Their policy is, therefore, alive with constant hope, and all else can wait—all else must be made subservient to that policy. *Enosis*, union, pervades the school, the Church, the judiciary, and the Legislature ; and yet one may be permitted to doubt whether the cry for union is any longer heartfelt. If what the worker needs is a peaceful livelihood, what the intellectual needs is respect and co-operation. A misunderstood Government, ignorant of the language, without plan or policy or enthusiasm or friends, seems very proud, aloof and godlike. If they would only come down to earth the humans would be so much more comfortable.

One might point out here that though Cyprus saw nothing of the war, yet the war and the peace have weakened *Enosis*. Greece is no longer a monarchy, and has now no dynastic ambitions stretching as far east as Cyprus, while in between lie the Dodecanese, where Italians deal with *Enosis* on quite other lines than ours. Greece, too, has solidified since the days of disaster. Greek refugees have gone to Greece and Turkish minorities have had to leave. Just such a minority as we have in Cyprus pathetically begged to be allowed to become Christian and remain in Crete ;

but they had to leave, and that cannot be the end of Cypriot Moslems after fifty years of British rule. Lastly, before the war Greece lay under the shelter of Russia and the Greek Church ; now Greece lies under the shelter of Great Britain. There is no longer antagonism, but rather alliance between the two tongues. A *rapprochement* with the people is more possible now than at any previous time since 1878.

That does not, however, change the fact that (1) the Constitution of 1882, (2) communal representation, and (3) the aloofness, impartiality and neutrality of the British demi-gods have spoilt our experiment in Cyprus, and, if applied to Palestine, will spoil that experiment also.

Our greatest failure has been in education. Education has been left to the communities and the Church. The State *ne se mêle pas*. In 1923 the State began for the first time to appoint the teachers in elementary schools, but the material is poor, there is no training college, and the teachers cannot teach English ; control remains entirely with the communities, though the State finds most of the money. Less than one-third of the children over ten attend school. The secondary schools are entirely free from Government control, but two Moslem schools have English masters. The Moslem schools prepare for higher education at Constantinople, and the Greek schools for the university at Athens. The result is that " French is spoken by the more educated classes," though " there is usually to be found someone who can speak and even read and write " English. After fifty years of British rule this is indeed wonderful. Poor as our beginnings have been in Palestine, we have evidently nothing to learn from Cyprus here, except what to avoid.

If we turn to taxation, there again one finds only what to avoid. It is true that we gave up in early days

the attempt to collect the tithe from grapes and fruits and vegetables, but on the cereal crops till quite recent times we continued to collect the tithe in kind. At least in Palestine they have advanced so far as to collect in cash. But last year, by a great effort, Cyprus abolished the tithe altogether. This hereditary burden upon the land, which used to bring in one-half the revenue of the country, was removed, and lands and rents have risen in value accordingly. The burden was thrown instead upon the whole community in the shape of additional import duties—the consumer pays more, and the landlord gets more.

Once, when a similar suggestion was made in England to relieve the local rates on agricultural land out of the pockets of the other taxpayers, Lord Goschen wrote as follows: "It has been correctly held as an axiom that rates on land constitute a kind of rent-charge upon those lands for the benefit of the public. You, however, ignore these hereditary burdens altogether. . . . Your plea includes the relief of the owner of land from burdens which they have borne for centuries, which have entered into the selling value of those lands, and have been taken into account in every transaction connected with them, and to divide those burdens amongst all kinds of incomes, not excepting those which are derived from personal exertions of every kind" (*Hansard*, April 20th, 1896). That was long ago, but the laws of political economy remain the same from century to century, and even Cyprus is not exempt from them. Here, at least, Palestine is finding a better way out.

They have the Wergo also in Cyprus, there called Verghi. This is a tax of ·4 per cent. (or 1*d.* in the £) on all real estate. Captain Orr, one of the best of our colonial administrators, writing in 1917, says: "In order that this property tax should be properly

assessed an accurate record and valuation of all existing property is clearly indispensable. . . . It was not till 1907 that the Legislative Council decided to pass a law providing for the revaluation and registration of all immovable property in the island, which entailed the carrying out of a cadastral survey, now in progress."[1] It is still in progress in 1927, and one can say with certainty that the landlords of Cyprus, in Legislative Council assembled, will never permit except in theory, the levying of a tax of 1*d.* in the £ on their real estate. The Verghi, too, will be "abolished," and instead the workers will be taxed by means of import duties, export duties and salt monopolies.

The workers progress little under British rule in Cyprus. "Unskilled labour (white) in Cyprus is plentiful. . . . The average wages paid for unskilled adult male labour were 18·26*d.*" a day in 1925. This is less than the Arab gets in Palestine, and only half the wages of the unskilled Jew. Female labour gets 1s. a day. There are no labour laws, and (so we are informed) "no labour problems."[2] When we took over from the Turk, about one-third of the cultivable land of the island was in fact cultivated, but we have now increased this by 50 per cent. Prices of land have risen enormously, and the cultivable land that is still uncultivated is, of course, too expensive for the Cypriot "unskilled labour" to cultivate for themselves. Perhaps here, too, we may see an argument for postponing in Palestine the grant of representative government; the representatives provide too often an excuse for British officials to rest on their oars.

Cyprus, like many other similarly circumstanced countries (Greece and Palestine among the number),

[1] *Cyprus under British Rule*, C. W. Orr, 1918.
[2] Cyprus, Official Report, 1925.

suffers from a perpetual feud between the owners of flocks and the tillers of the soil. No doubt this struggle went on in the time of Abraham. Goats are the special aversion of the tillers—trees, vineyards, crops, all go down before the goat. And here Cyprus gives a lead to Palestine. Local option by a special ballot is allowed to each village. If the exclusion of goats is carried, the village and lands are scheduled, and after twelve months the Government buys any goat in the village at arbitration price. Thereafter any goat found on the land is confiscated. Such is the unpopularity of the goat that few owners care to wait for the arbitration ; they go or sell before the year is out. Sheep too are taxed, and no effort is spared to develop the more intensive form of cultivation, except the obvious one of taxing land value.

In agriculture generally, Cyprus shows the way to Palestine. Locusts have been eradicated. There is an agricultural school, an agricultural bank which operates chiefly through numerous co-operative credit societies, the agricultural department provides travelling lecturers, and numbers of model farms flourish for silk, flax, cotton, oranges, beans and various crops. There are stock farms and five good stud stables with a large veterinary staff. In procuring agricultural education for the people the Government have faced and overcome difficulties which they have not yet dared to face where children are concerned. There, conservatism has proved too strong, or the Government too languid.

Famagusta harbour has been developed in advance of trade ; irrigation and drainage has limited malaria and created land ; there are 800 miles of metalled motor roads, roads which actually are now made to run parallel to the railway. Minor roads are innumerable, and I note a law of 1900, by which every able-bodied villager must give a week's work yearly to

whatever road or work of public utility the village committee may decide.

Village and municipal administration has remained thoroughly Turkish. The village remains as it was and where it was—Greek or Turkish or Armenian—while the Muktar and the elders rule. The municipalities have many powers to do things and to raise money on the annual value of property; they prefer to do as little as possible and to raise money by other methods, as of old. Limassol alone, having a considerable revenue from weighing dues on the export of beans, has good well-lighted streets, a hospital, a public garden, markets and slaughter-houses, and above all, a municipal band.

In Cyprus, as in Palestine, the six English commissioners, who constitute the link between the Secretariat at Nicosia and the people, have not the time to guide and administer and fraternise and judge. They are fully occupied in collecting the taxes. Here, too, as in Palestine, the judiciary is wholly separated from the executive. There are many drawbacks to the Indian system, but as I saw it in South Africa and as I see the alternative to-day in the Levant, I prefer the resident-magistrate-commissioner. Such an officer, with his assistant magistrate, revenue officer, and police captain, can supervise municipality and education, roads and forests, revenue and rascality. He is the eye of the Government, and the connecting link with the people.

Few of the mistakes that we have made in Cyprus can now be remedied, but we can learn from those mistakes and avoid the same in Palestine. Some of those mistakes may be put down to lack of experience, some to lack of courage, but mostly we must blame the premature grant of a sham responsible Parliament. If there had been at Nicosia a safe official majority, if

we had not had to play off Turk against Greek, if we had not had to resort to strategem to secure progress, the administration would have laid better foundations and taken more pride in its job. In such a country one generation of Crown colony rule would have been enough—five years was enough in South Africa—but three years was not enough to change the Levant from obedience to liberty. Crown colony rule had to be continued somehow under the colour of a free constitution. The simplest way seemed to be the way of "divide and rule"—communal representation was invented—and now, because the communities hate each other, years and generations pass without there being possibility of freedom or that respect for English methods, without which no country can come into and join the new Union-Empire.

CHAPTER VI

TRANSJORDANIA

It may be said that Transjordania has no status and no shape. It is the old Welsh March, with Ibn Saud and his Bedouin beyond the March to play the part of Llewellyn ap Griffith. Colonel Cox is the Marcher Lord with his Air Knights. If the Emir Abdullah had been different Transjordania might have been like Irak or an Indian Native State—definite and delimitated—but Abdullah proved non-negotiable.

At the end of the war Transjordania formed a part of the Arab-Syrian kingdom of Damascus under King Feisul, son of King Hussein of the Hedjaz. They were both our protégées, and the French did not feel satisfied that Feisul, at Damascus, quite carried out the idea of the Sykes-Picot Treaty. Feisul put up a poor fight, and in 1920 the French entered Damascus, and we compensated Feisul with the Kingdom of Irak, to which he was duly elected.

Abdullah, Feisul's brother, attempted to reach Syria in the spring of 1921 to recover his brother's throne, but he was induced to remain on the way, and appointed Emir of Transjordania by the British military administration. The following year the British Government declared that the country came under the British Mandate, and in 1923 the High Commissioner of Palestine, who is also administrator of Transjordania, announced the independance of the lands across Jordan on two conditions: (1) that a Constitution be worked out for that country in accordance with

British views, and (2) that a treaty be concluded between Transjordania and Great Britain for the regulation of mutual rights and duties springing from the Mandate.

But nothing was done. The expectations are still unfulfilled. There is no Constitution, and the political status of the country remains in a state of flux, very suitable to the marches of the British Empire. King Feisul, in Irak, did conclude a treaty which regulates our mutual relations, and, at the same time, anticipates the termination of the mandatory relationship with Great Britain after a term of years—a doubtful and extensible term, it is true. This did not happen in Transjordania, for our experience of the Emir Abdullah was by no means satisfactory. He inherited from his father a certain love of autocracy and extravagance, and his administration was so expensive that in the interests of all concerned, including the British taxpayer, he was finally deprived of the administration, even of his own estate, and put upon a civil list like a pensioner. The rest of his estate is reserved for the payment of his debts, and he has gradually been excluded from Government business.

If it should be alleged that all that is written above reads as though written 2,000 years ago, about the same places by a Roman cynic, I cannot help it. The parallel breaks down because the Roman Senate drew tribute from Pontus and Pergamos, from Herod and Ptolomey, while the modern British Parliament pays grants in aid instead of receiving them. Transjordania still costs us a quarter of a million a year—so long as the administration is separate from Palestine.

There is now as Prime Minister a man of European education, Hassaan Chalid Pasha ; three Englishmen are at the head of the three chief ministries, and a Palestinian Arab is Chief Secretary The ruler is Colonel

Cox. Every care is taken (as long ago by Rome) to preserve the Arab nationalist flavour, and only last November Arab delegates and the Government discussed the establishment of a Constitution. The Government's terms, however, were not satisfactory or not accepted, and Transjordania remains, fortunately, without a Constitution. Frontier provinces are better so; it is rather a wide jump from sheiks to democracy.

So Transjordania has no status and, as wisely, it has no shape. The tribes beyond Jordan of old were—Reuben, Gad and half Manasseh; we knew their shape, bulging at the top. But half Manasseh, in a fit of pique or to annoy the Jews, we gave to France, and the tricolour waves above the bulls of Bashan. Atlases and primers are now mostly blank on the borders of Transjordania, but Transjordania is stretching, as border provinces are apt to do. Last year, when King Hussein vanished, we annexed Maan and all the desert down to Akaba on the Red Sea, annexed a railway and a destroyer base. Now we have a boundary treaty proceeding with Ibn Saud, which will outline Transjordania to the south-east; and somewhere in the eastern desert Transjordania ends and Irak begins. At least for railway, road, pipe-line, or air route, we stretch all-British from Bagdad to the Mediterranean; and from north to south, the Hedjaz pilgrim railway runs right through Transjordania—when it runs at all. The control over all these through routes gives to the frontier province its peculiar importance to Great Britain. One has but to mention an "artery" or "submarine base" to see that they must be controlled, and the province stretched. One sees equally clearly that it must remain painted red on the map.

The periodic boilings-over of Arabia have disturbed many Empires, and the frontier province and the

frontier force watch Ibn Saud, now King of Mecca, or rather they watch his untamed followers. For Ibn Saud is our very good friend, having further south a rival who is backed by Italian intrigue and aeroplanes. But there have been Wahabi attacks upon the frontier, which have melted under our aeroplanes, and robber raiders are still eminently respectable citizen-adventurers in Arabia. We rely chiefly upon fear of the British name, for our force in Transjordania is small—a few aeroplanes and cars, police, and 2,000 of the "Palestinian and Transjordanian Frontier Defence Force." The British taxpayer pays for all aeroplanes and cars, and for half the cost of the Frontier Defence Force, the other half being paid by Palestine.

The attitude of the *Daily Mail* and British taxpayer towards this sort of thing is well known. At any moment they may refuse to pay any more, and the chief worry of the administrator is to acquire a settled income and a balanced budget. Therefore, and for other reasons, the chief object of administration is to persuade the Bedouin to settle down, to turn from grazing to cultivation. Fixing the nomad on the land means cash and security. It also means civilisation, and that the frontier province has finished its work. When it is safe for the fellaheen, it is also safe for the Jews.

At present all goes smoothly, but there is just one danger that is either overlooked or has not been adequately guarded against. I shall be told that it is fanciful, but history teaches no such lesson. There are very few British in the Frontier Defence Force. The rank and file are mainly Arab and mainly Moslem. Such troops are not always reliable, especially in times of danger and religious exaltation. Whatever officers may say about loyalty and confidence, mutiny is not impossible ; and, after the officers, it would always be

the Jews who would have to meet the storm. It is therefore asking for trouble to exclude Jews from the force on the ground that Arab troops would not like working with them. If Arab likes and dislikes are so powerful as to dictate, the danger in time of trouble is likely to be the greater. The Jews, if not merely because they are white men, yet for their very safety's sake, would be undoubtedly reliable and make much better fighters. A leaven of such men would put a steel frame in the machine. As Palestine pays half the cost of the Force, the practical exclusion of Jews is as offensive as it is impolitic.

At present the Jewish settlers are excluded from Transjordania on the alleged ground that their presence would annoy the raw Arab Bedouin, or that they would not be safe. No comment is needed on this exclusion ; it fits in too well with the whole attitude of the present administration towards Jews and towards the policy of the Balfour Declaration. Read " British " for " Jews," and one sees how humiliating the policy would be. A change of tone will come in time, and then a change of policy.

CHAPTER VII

THE PILGRIM FATHERS OF PALESTINE

Now that we have seen the setting and stated the problem, let us look at the progress of the great experiment. How is colonisation proceeding, and what are the materials?

Scarcely any of the Jews who go to Palestine know anything worth knowing about agriculture: most of them want to cultivate land, and, as there is available neither sufficient land, nor sufficient capital, nor sufficient education, most of them have to put up with the towns. On balance, some 90,000 Jews have settled in Palestine since the War, making 160,000 all told. Of these not more than 32,000 have found any work on the land, and less than 5,000 are working as free men or women in the forty-one new free Zionist colonies. But that is where most Jews of Palestine, and most Jews of Eastern Europe, would be if they could—free men in the free colonies of Palestine. It is not merely the getting back to the land from the economic slavery of the city, 2,000 years of the city—it is not merely getting back to one's *own* land from somebody else's city—it is, as one can understand after seeing these colonies, the opening of the doors of heaven!

There is nothing very exciting about the old Jewish colonies which were being founded on charitable lines by Baron Edmund de Rothschild from 1878 onwards. The first waves were plantation colonies, and Petah Tikvah, Richon-le-Zion, Zichron Jacob, and Rosh Pinah have done well enough commercially with

oranges, wine and tobacco. They are pleasant places, with their great eucalyptus trees and sun and mountains. But most of the old Jewish settlers are not now working on the land; they are following the example of the old Wurtemburg colonists at Sarona alongside; they are directing, and leave the natives to do the work.[1] Yet every true Jew knows that Jews will never be natives of Palestine till they do the work themselves.

The next wave of the Rothschild colonies, called Pica colonies (Palestine Jewish Colonisation Association), dropped the expensive plantations and went in like the natives for growing cereals, but on a larger scale. They ran to 80 acres of land per family; and, there again, the family has sublet the hard work to natives for a share of the proceeds. It is easy to be landlord anywhere. Nor are these colonists so very prosperous; they tend to drop to the native level of comfort; they are sinking to the native, and Jews cannot afford to sink in their homeland.[2]

So matters stood when the Zionist organisation began to take in hand the colonisation of Palestine. They founded Daganiah in 1909, and Merhaviah in 1910, now remarkable institutions, and since the War they have settled the whole of the Emek from Mount Carmel to the Jordan, till there are at present forty-one of their new free colonies, and the whole prospect of a Jewish Palestine has changed.

They learnt from the older colonies that their settlements must be based on self-labour and must carry on mixed farming—feeding themselves. Plantations, even small ones, are too expensive, for they must take years

[1] But 2,000 Jewish agricultural workers are employed at Petach Tikvah, the most successful and populous of the old colonies.

[2] P.I.C.A. colonies are still being started, and, now, on thoroughly satisfactory lines, as at Benjaminah.

to come into bearing ; cereals require too much land, and the Zionists had neither the land nor the capital, so they were forced into mixed farming, and they were forced into the Kvutzah or cheap communal colony. Necessity and experience worked together to bring about the great change. For the fact is, the pioneers of Palestine (Chaluzim) are not merely revolutionising their new country, they are revolutionising our ideas of a peasant population and even of economics.

The Kvutzah is a voluntary commune consisting of anything from eight to eighty families, farming in common anything from 20 to 2,000 acres of mixed land. Or, some Kvutzoth farm nothing at all ; they are the trades union with a common lodging house—a sort of brotherhood, similar to those working among the new British migrants to Australia. As far as possible the agricultural Kvutzah supplies its own wants—from food and doctoring, to cigarettes and clothes. Nobody receives wages. The existence is that of the desert island, and those Kvutzoth are lucky which have an Admirable Crichton to guide them. The elected committee (Vaad) rules. This committee consists generally of the specialists in the various lines of production, who get together in the evening and decide what work shall be done the next day. Unpleasant jobs, like cooking, are taken in rotation ; that is why the feeding is so uncomfortably primitive.

Let me take an example, and I admit that it is the one that pleased me best. Daganiah A. is a Kvutzah of twenty-four families lying beside Jordan and the Sea of Galilee. No man who loves his fellows can fail in this beautiful spot to imagine that at last he has found paradise. They cultivate 333 acres of partly-irrigated land, and in 1924 the gross value of the produce worked out at over £4,000. A more recent and immature example is the great Kvutzah of Ain

Harod (Gideon's Well in the Emek), where eighty-one families cultivate 1,425 acres and produced £9,100 gross. Each of these colonies has a reserve of land at present uncultivated amounting to about one-third of the whole.

A whole storm of controversy has arisen over these Kvutzoth. The Jews just hate to be associated with anything that anyone could call Bolshevism. Since the war, since this " Bolshevism " became so unpopular with subscribers, most of the colonies founded have been on the lines of individual cultivation. Nahalal is a striking example of individual success. But as each year passes by and the Kvutzoth (there are twenty-two of them) continue to survive and even to progress, attention is inevitably directed towards the new experiment. An unnatural " crank " scheme must have collapsed in eighteen years. The Kvutzah must somehow be natural to Jews, and yet the Jews are notoriously individualist.

It seems probable that the individualism of the Jew is chiefly expressed by a marked dislike of working for someone else—for a master. In the Kvutzah they are not working for a master. Then these Jews have all come from old Russia, where they have imbibed a strong " community " feeling in the *ghetto*, and that strong hatred of the capitalist system which is so marked a feature of European social democracy. They are passionate Zionists, and as passionate libertarians. To build up the Jewish homeland they will suffer any hardship ; to build up an economically free society they will even suffer ridicule. In the Kvutzoth their heads and hearts are more in the skies than they are in individualist Nahalal or Balfouria. They have been made *exaltés* by something more than Zionism. This feeling is necessary for success among pioneer people. It inspired the Pilgrim Fathers ; in a way it inspired

too the Voortrekkers, who went north across the Orange River a hundred years ago. There must be something worth making the sacrifice for, or no man would make the sacrifice demanded of Chaluzim all the world over.

So the spirit of co-operation and self-subordination has been found in the Jews and used to the utmost. Even in the individualist colonies there is as much co-operation as is to be found in Denmark ; each is a little republic. The Vaad looks after the schools, the policing, the doctor ; it levies voluntary taxes, deals with the Government or the Zionist creditors. It has not yet built many synagogues, for the Chaluz, being mostly Socialist, are not much given to the older religions ; but at Nahalal they were putting one up for the old folks as the colonists became prosperous enough to get out these old parents of theirs from Poland and Roumania. It will be seen that the essence of all this " communism " is that it shall be voluntary.

Here comes in the fact that the Kvutzoth suit the roving spirit of the people. Settlers shift from one Kvutzah to another, or back to town. The Kvutzah educates and eliminates. The man who wants to work for himself moves on, as soon as he has learnt his trade, to an individualist colony ; another goes off to friends or relations at another Kvutzah ; another moves on to see life or seek a husband ; another is moved on as a failure. Only gradually, as the Kvutzah becomes prosperous, does roving cease. Few of its inhabitants will want to leave Daganiah or Merhaviah now, and such communities can pick and choose whom they will have.

It will be observed that the Kvutzoth provide education in agriculture, a very necessary service. In every other case of successful colonisation the immigrants have known something of the trade, but here the men, and more emphatically the women, know

nothing. The Zionist leaders tried to provide an education abroad which should instil essentials before they landed in Palestine. But that did not work; conditions were so different. They have established training schools for boys and girls and orphans and youths all over Palestine, and still the supply of trained settlers is all too small. Often the raw immigrant is sent as a labourer at 15 piastres a day to work on the plantations of the rich Jews at Petah Tikvah or Rehoboth, so that he may learn his trade. But admittedly the best education of all is a year in a Kvutzah. There, in each department in turn, a man may learn his job, and though he will not get 15 piastres a day he will be one of the family.

The Elders of Zion had also to think of expense. Common-rooms, common farm buildings are cheaper than a number of individual houses and sheds, and in a new fight with nature two men are more than double one. Moreover, the capital wanted could not be made available at once; the equipment of any colony had to be spread out over many years. That delay is not practicable in the case of individual holdings.

Of course one would think that they would quarrel in these Kvutzoth, but they are voluntary communities, and those who do not fit in can leave. One would suspect slacking, but public opinion seems to be as strong a propulsive force as private gain. Lack of care in the use of the tools and machinery of the community is classed as a drawback of the Kvutzah, but the workers of the Kvutzah are the rawest material for agriculture, much more raw than the educated worker who has taken up an individual holding at Metullah or Hezekiel.

In fact, the Kvutzoth must be regarded as schools where they teach each other with little help from nature or from experts; and, being thrown on their

own, "caring for nobody, no not they," they have a jolly, a friendly and a free life. They have brought with them a dance from the Russian countryside, the Hora. They dance it in Palestine with noise and zest. I doubt if they ever danced it so in Kovno or in Kichinev. Now they need not bother what people will think of them—a great relief to a bubbling nature. Nor did they ever dress like this in Vilna. The Jew we know on the street is too well manicured and laundered, but the Jew of Kfar Gileadi, standing beside the grave of Captain Trumpledor, has forgotten all about his clothes. Football shorts are popular, none wear hats, and the women have a lamentable preference for the fields, in breeches, to the kitchen in an apron. Football is universal; the children were surprised and delighted to learn that it was largely played in England; they had thought it was a Jewish game. I feel certain that for the word "soccer" they will discover a biblical derivation.

Gaiety and self-respect seemed to me to be so obvious. The children were frank and civil, instead of self-conscious and silly. I suppose no Jew ever considers himself as belonging to "the lower orders," and here among a peasant population it did not seem necessary to stress the fact. In the rest of the world, even where men till their own land, the peasants are a slow, stagnant, isolated breed, apt to grumble and to hate cleverness, and their women are even sadder beasts of burden. But in the new Jew colonies the men and women read the books in their libraries and are for ever discussing. "Too many lectures," said one man to me, laughing. Or, again, "The Jewish nation must, it is true, be to a great extent a nation of peasants. But where is it written that peasants must be boors?" So the children are well educated; being all, as it were, "daughters of the regiment," they risk being spoilt. Owing to the indifference of the Government they are

not being taught English—just those whom we would so gladly add to improve the stock.

How have these colonies been financed and started? At the present time the Jews are about one-fifth of the population of Palestine, and own about one-twentieth of the land. Of the 250,000 acres owned by Jews, about half belongs to the P.I.C.A.; other private settler Jews make up the 200,000, and about 50,000 acres belong to the Jewish National Fund.[1] This part is inalienable, but is let on long lease to the settlers at rents which shall not depend upon the improvements effected by the settlers. To induce the Turkish effendis to sell, the J.N.F. had to pay about twice as much as the land was worth economically; roughly they paid £20 an acre for raw undrained land. Then the land had to be made fit and available for the colony; then the buildings, stock and equipment had to be found. Except in a few colonies, such as Balfouria, the settlers had nothing to start with. The holding of each family averages 25 acres, of which perhaps two will be sooner or later irrigated.

The cost, therefore, per family, works out somewhat as follows:—

	£
Land	500
Buildings	320
Live-stock	91
and fodder for the same	40
Tools, machines	73
and petrol for the year	10
Fencing, draining, manure	50
Seeds, plants, wind belts	40
Victuals for family, one year	42
Unforeseen expenses	34
	£1,200

[1] They bought 5,000 more acres in 1926, and other Jewish organisations bought or leased another 10,000 acres.

On all this capital interest has to be paid at about 3 per cent., together with a sinking fund, and the chief criticism of the Jewish colonies must be that so far few have paid interest and sinking fund.[1] The excuse has always been that the colony or holding has not yet been fully equipped. For it must be observed that the above figures are only an ideal estimate. It is not a government with unlimited credit that is financing these settlements, it is the voluntary subscriptions of the Jews throughout the world. You cannot borrow money on the security of annual subscriptions, and the Zionist organisation has simply never had the £1,200,000 required to put on the land the 1,000 families that have got there. It seems extraordinary that they have had no government help in this work, not even an agricultural bank to help with the advances or to give loans on the security of the land that has been bought. The whole position of the Jews in Palestine is irregular and peculiar. The Government seems to wash its hands of them and to let them go their own way in everything, so that they have come to constitute a state and government of their own inside the State. The British Government have now given them powers to compulsorily tax themselves. Tel Aviv township is a little republic of 43,000 inhabitants, providing its own police and justice and schools and revenue. This abnormality cannot continue, and seems only to have arisen through carelessness.

The dual parallel existence of two civilisations—Jew and Arab—which has caused this strange abnormality, shows up the extraordinary difficulties of this Jewish colonisation. First the British Government must regard itself as the protector and father of the less efficient and more helpless civilisation; so that they

[1] I am told that Daganiah A., Geva, Gan Shemuel and Naginad, are now paying interest charges on their debts.

feel themselves constantly against the efficient capable colonists from the West. They do not feel called on to help them ; their duty seems to them to be done when they do not hinder the higher civilisation, and they are always ready to discover obstacles to progress. Private tastes come in to affect the co-operation ; the Arab is so much more easily managed than the civilised Jew, and they cannot yet look upon the Jew as an Englishman. The gulf between Kenya and Palestine is immense, and all created by the conviction that a Jew is not an Englishman. If one could but strike a mean between the two Governments at Nairobi and at Jerusalem—one convinced of its prime duty to the settler, the other convinced of its prime duty to the native—both colonies would benefit.

The greatest difficulty caused by the dual civilisation is seen, however, in the question of labour. If the Jews are to have a homeland they must be workers there, and the workers must be able to live without sinking to the level of the lower civilisation. If the Jews are to compete with the Arabs for jobs of work they must go down to the Arab level, or they must bring the Arabs up to their higher standard. Already in the towns they have got the Arab wages up—they have got Arabs into their trades unions. But outside the towns, on the roads, on the railways, etc., the Arab fellaheen will work for 9 piastres (1*s.* 10*d.*) a day, whereas the Jew cannot possibly manage on less than 15 piastres (3*s.* 1*d.*) a day. In Egypt, the fellaheen will work for 5 piastres (1*s.*) a day, so that it can be said that already the presence of the higher civilisation has raised the fellaheen from 5 to 9, or by 80 per cent. It is probable, moreover, that the superiority of Jewish over Arab work is correctly measured by the difference between 9 and 15 piastres.

For agricultural work the wage disparity is greater.

The Jews will not let their children work and do not care to use their women as beasts of burden. Now most of the picking or harvesting is work that can be done by women and children, so that in the old plantation colonies the tendency must always be to employ fellaheen labour in preference to Jew. That is why the Zionists are so set on the self-labour of the new colonies. That is why they go further and endeavour to get the settlers to satisfy all their own needs and rely as little as may be on competitive sales in the open market. It is easy for the Jew settlers to supply themselves; it is more difficult for them to compete with the fellaheen of Palestine and supply the markets of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem; it is more difficult still for the Jew settlers to export and compete in the neutral markets with the almost slave labour of Egypt, where the land is all naturally irrigated. If the Jew is to be a worker in his own homeland, he must develop the self-supporting colony, and he must raise the standard of comfort of the town Arabs by making common cause with them in the matter of wages and conditions of labour. As the Government is the chief employer of labour the Government can do more in this matter to help the Jewish settlement than almost anywhere else. They can establish by a fair wages clause a living wage, below which they will not buy Arab labour.

It is idle to pretend that the British Government has so far helped or shown a desire to help the establishment of the Jewish homeland. Malaria has cursed the country, and, above all, the Jewish settlers on the bad lands which they have made good. The greater part of the settlers died at Hederah, and others of the old colonies, as a result of malaria. To cure this the swamps must be drained, but all such drainage is left to be done by the Jews, and, in the case of the Huleh Marsh, an obstacle has been put in their way to prevent

them from getting the land to drain. Sanitary drainage should have been the first work of a civilised government. One finds, too, that the Agricultural Experimental Station is managed and paid for by the Jews without any assistance. So good is the research work done at this station in Tel Aviv, that the Empire Marketing Board are now contemplating taking it over, in whole or part, for the whole of our sub-tropical Empire. But, indeed, it is only very recently that our governors have recognised at all the possible value to the Empire of this new Jewish Dominion.

CHAPTER VIII

COLONISATION IN MACEDONIA

It is quite refreshing, after passing through Palestine and Egypt, to find a piece of constructive work being well done—well done by an Englishman. Never in the history of the world has colonisation been done on so large a scale. Within three years 1,400,000 refugees have been planted down among 5,500,000 native Greeks. Where I have just been, in Macedonia, 500,000 have been planted on the land and 300,000 in the suburbs of Salonica. They have found room for the rest in Crete, in Thrace, in Thessaly, all around the mighty city Athens-Piræus, and in small doses over Greece. If one did not look inside the unconsecrated mosques and see and smell the riff-raff still camping there, one would imagine the job finished. But these are the "won't works," still left and wailing ever more lustily for compensation as an excuse for their incompetence.

After the flight to Smyrna, after the Lausanne Treaty, in the autumns of 1922 and 1923, they came in like swarms of locusts, from Smyrna and Ionia, from Gallipoli and Turkish Thrace. Half the able-bodied men had been murdered off; the bulk were women and children with nothing but clothes and saintly relics. So Dr. Nansen came, and saw, and reported to the League.

There was another side. Just as the Treaty of

Lausanne ordered the deportation of Greeks to Greece, so it also ordered the deportation of Turks to Turkey, and the Bulgars had to go to Bulgaria. No Dr. Nansen was ever sent by the League to Turkey to see how 350,000 miserable Turks survived, expelled from Grecian Thrace ; and only this year has the League found money to help the Bulgars with their still unemployed 200,000 refugees.

This transplanting of peoples, according to their tongue or religion, is a wretched business. It exposes the dirty side of religion and nationalism. Few or none of the peasants want to be torn up by the roots, but it has to be done to satisfy the politicians, who insist on governing people who only want to be left to govern themselves. The Turks in Crete pathetically begged to be allowed to become Christian in order to be allowed to stop in their homes ; but it was felt that they would not be good Christians. There is no Greek statesman to-day who will not forget the misery of the 1,400,000, and even the hideous massacres of his fellow countrymen, in the satisfaction of looking at his Macedonia now wholly Greek. Bulgars and Turks and Serbs are gone, and one looks out over plain and mountain, all dotted with red-roofed Greek villages far away to the horizon. Ninety-five per cent. are Greek, or at least 95 per cent. Greek and Jew. One thousand three hundred and ninety new villages have been established in this war-desolated land, and all are very Greek. The old inhabitants of the country, looking a little lost, are spoken of as *indigènes* (the natives), obviously on a lower level of civilisation. Macedonia, like Palestine, is colonising upwards.

At first the Greek Government had to bear all the burden that charitable Americans and English did not assume. Relief cost the Greeks nearly £6,000,000 all told, and what the " Near East Relief," the " Save the

Children Fund," and the " All British Appeal " have spent I do not know, though the signs are obvious enough. Nansen reported in 1922; the Bank of England found the first unauthorised million in November, 1923, and the loan to bring in £10,000,000 was not floated till December, 1924.

The loan bears interest at 7 per cent., was floated at 88, is secured on taxes and monopolies and, notably, on all the land and buildings occupied by the colonists. The land alone is ample security for the loan, and the land was to be provided free by the Greek Government. They were to find 1,225,000 acres fit for the plough—that was the essence of the contract; and they did find the land, or at least, they let the Commission find and requisition the land for themselves. In Bulgaria, I gather there is no land to be found by the Government. That is unfortunate, for the success of the Greek colonies is due mainly to the fact that sufficient land was made available.

The Commission set up by the League for establishing the Greek refugees consists of an American President, an English Vice-President, and two Greeks. As the American President and the Greek Commissioners have changed many times and been many times engaged on other work, responsibility has fallen in the main on Sir John Campbell, the Vice-President. It is his child, his child and that of M. Caramanos—" the founder of cities." As all had to be improvised, there being no maps, no statistics, no evidences of title, and certainly no civilised precedents, it needed men who would take responsibility, and even men who could not be checked and bound by precedent. The Governments gave them a completely free hand, being themselves absorbed in more vital politics, as kings, generals and presidents rose and fell. One would expect " graft." There must have been some graft in the handling of these big con-

tracts ; but it cannot have been serious, for there is no room for leakage, the thing having been done so cheaply.

First, they had to find the land. The only way was to take—" requisition "—all land that was capable of being cultivated and yet not cultivated. That they did ; most was land that Turkish farmers had evacuated under the Treaty of Lausanne. Some was not ; some was actually claimed by Englishmen who are still claiming compensation. But for twenty years now, by successive Acts of Parliaments, the Greeks have been taking lands from landlords and endowing the peasants, and to-day there are very few *tchiflik* (landlord-owned) estates in Greece. So some 1,700,000 acres were requisitioned, 1,060,000 cultivable, and 600,000 uncultivable but fit for pasture. Eighty per cent. of this land lies in Macedonia.

Then the colonists collected in groups, and representatives went out to see and to select the village site and land. As far as possible the new village replaced the old ruined village in Thrace or Asia Minor. The priest was always there with the relics. So New Ephesus was founded, the land roughly allotted, and the building material carted out from Salonica. Each family got about ten acres, half a plough, and a draft animal or cow. They also had the material for building—tiles, timber and cement—and they had seed and food for a year. About one-third of the houses were built by the Commission, and these cost from £50 to £100 ; so the other two-thirds were built by the colonists themselves and cost only half the money. The " houses " have mud floors, and no chimneys and fixed windows, and accommodate the live stock as well as humans, but even so, one hardly understands how all this—food, seed, stock, houses and various loans—can possibly have done for an average of £80 per family !

The difficulty in all such modern cases of colonisation is not so much finding houses as finding work. There is not much difference between the Greek refugee, huddled in the mosques and churches, and the British refugee "on the dole." Two hundred thousand of the Greek refugees had money, and have settled in on their own—the bar, the stock exchange and the medical profession have been overstocked with a thrusting race. Of the other 1,200,000, one-half are now planted out, colonising the country, and the other half are in new suburbs round the towns. The new city of Byron with 10,000 inhabitants rises outside Athens. Athens and the Piræus together (and they now join) number 800,000 souls—the largest city on the Mediterranean.

So that in town and country alike new industries had to be established. Unlike Palestine, they have been encouraged. The textile industry is new, so is the potting industry, the cement industry and the carpet-making trade. In towns and in the 2,000 new country villages there are the hand looms and the carpet sheds, once peculiar to Asia Minor. Too many men were killed off, so that a surplus of women turn naturally to something less slow or exacting than agriculture.

When Alva and Farnese expelled from the Spanish Netherlands all who differed from them in religion, when Ghent died and grass grew in the streets of Antwerp, then Rotterdam arose and the industry and trade of the United Provinces became a marvel to the world. So now Turkey has been "purged" and "purified," and Smyrna is dead and Constantinople grass-grown, and the non-conformists are building up the industries and trade of the land of their adoption. Societies have a knack of expelling the best.

Here are some of the figures of the growth of Greece :—

Year.	Imports. (in millions of drachmæ.)	Exports.
1922 . . .	3,085	2,485
1923 . . .	6,035	2,545
1924 . . .	8,058	3,276
1925 . . .	9,936 ?	4,020 ?

Or take the consumption of cement.

Year.	Produced in Greece. Tons.	Imported. Tons.
1922 . . .	37,000	908
1923 . . .	36,000	9,500
1924 . . .	55,000	25,000
1925 . . .	90,000 ?	65,000 ?

While the town refugee is working for a master, though it may be at some new industry, the rural colonist is working for himself. They are not servants but free peasants, and as such offer a fine example of good political construction. There is in Macedonia not only the solution of a Greek unemployed problem, but also the creation of free men in Greece. Nature has not helped ; harvests have been bad ; malaria has ravaged some of the colonies ; but in three years they are on their legs, and at a marvellously cheap cost.

Land they have had, and their holdings (of anything from 2 to 18 acres) were worth anything from £60 to £240, but, beyond that, less than £100 per family of four has seen them through. They will have some day to pay interest and sinking fund. Such is the love of property that in many of the town settlements, as soon as title is available, they begin to pay off unasked. In the country one of the main difficulties is that there has as yet been no complete survey. No one knows precisely who owns what. While that

doubt remains, while holdings are liable to change, these individualists will not take the trouble to fence and manure, and plant and irrigate. What quarrels there are concern boundary disputes.

So it comes about that co-operation is not yet very strong, that the communal spirit, so much evidenced in the Jewish colonies in Palestine, hardly exists. There are already rich and poor in these colonies. Co-operation has begun, but must generally be compulsory. They co-operate to get the survey made, more doubtfully to make the water-furrow, most heartily to build the church. They prefer that the Commission should sink the wells, build the schools, provide the vets. and doctors, do in fact as much as possible and leave them to do what they want to do for themselves. Each colony has its leaders, but they lack educated leaders. Neither the local pope nor the local schoolmaster (where he exists) supplies this want. The doctor takes the place naturally in those villages which are lucky enough to have a resident doctor. Here, too, the settlers lead a desert-island existence. There are no police, nor post offices, nor tax gatherers. They are not taxed at all. The outside world and Government hardly exist for them. Yet in the evenings the men meet at the local café and discuss politics and the need of leaders. Greeks always discuss politics, and most believe they could be leaders.

It is interesting to compare the Grecian colonies in Macedonia with the Jewish colonies in Palestine. The Jewish colonies have cost seven times as much money ; they are on a higher scale—good houses, the latest cattle sheds, twice as much land per family. Both depend on self-work. Both have been started with loaned capital. Both have just got to the paying stage. Both have come among an alien people of inferior culture. If the Jews have had less help from Government

the Greeks have had less capital provided by their extraneous helpers. The Jews are more Western in clothes and mind and language ; the Greeks are more Western in their individualism, in their right to grumble, in their unconscious sense of superiority to anyone who is not a colonist. But the Jews all feel like Independence Day patriots. They are for ever the soldiers of Zion. The building-up of their country has become a passion to take the place of religion and priests and synagogues. This makes them capable of greater sacrifice of self, and causes the more extreme forms of co-operation one finds at Dagania. The Greek colonist thinks it an accursed shame that he was driven away from home ; the Jew colonist is still in raptures at having found home. The Greek cherishes his feasts and icons and costumes to remind him of his old home. The Jew wants to forget everything he thought or saw or knew when he was in Poland—he tries to forget the language he spoke there—before he became free.

Both sets of colonists have been badly hit by malaria from the undrained swamps ; both are getting over it as the swamps are drained ; but in both cases many colonies have had to be given up. The Greeks fixed up one colony at Philippi, just to please Brutus and Cassius and Shakespeare, but malaria destroyed the reunion, and the place stands empty to-day. One-fifth of the inhabitants of many of the colonies in Calcidice and the Vardar Valley died of the disease during the first year. But now births, at 35 per 1,000, are well ahead of deaths, and the universal boy scouts divide their time between football and the spraying of stagnant pools, doing their good deed with petrol. Till the American Foundation Company have really drained the marshes of the Vardar, the Strymon and the Halyacmon, and restored these vast areas to

cultivation, quinine will remain the essential import into Macedonia. Some of the new Refugee Loan might well be invested on these great drainage projects.

All the last three years, therefore, the Commission has been finding land, dividing it up, buying stock and seed and material, transporting it out, erecting houses, inspecting, advising, loaning, chastising many times, and making endless mistakes as men in a hurry must. They had to push out 1,200,000 unemployed and find them work and housing and sustenance, and do it all without plan at once. The League of Nations are to be felicitated on the material they had to do the work—and on the material they had to work up into men. There is the new country to witness to their work. Many of us knew it, a desert, during the war—now populous and prosperous. There are the well-dressed villages, averaging seventy-five families each, laid out like a little Detroit. There are the new industries ; the growing flocks and herds of the grazing colonies ; the fishing smacks of the fisher colonies ; the suburban towns and factories, all much more modern than ancient Greece. Production of cotton, tobacco, vines, cereals and roots all increase month by month, so that market-garden produce in Salonica is now cheaper than anywhere else in Europe, where once it was so dear. There are now two or three crops a year, where often there was waste before.

It is no wonder that the men who have organised all this feel proud, for since the war there has been created nothing to match the refugee colonies in Greece. But the refugees themselves have been a credit to Greece. Most of the private loans to agricultural refugees have been made by the Greek National Bank. They have advanced in this way over five million drachmæ on short term loan ; only 4 per cent. has not been paid

back on due date. And the governors of the bank report :—

> The area of arable land has tripled in Greece during the last four years. They (the refugees) have introduced new methods of cultivation, which they have taught to the natives, thus increasing the return both from their own and their neighbour's land. The cultivation of silk, vines, tobacco, cotton has been specially developed. Production has quintupled.

Colonists who will work hard, Greeks who will pay their debts, and for leaders men who can convert a disaster into a blessing to the world ! We in England may be well satisfied that we found most of the money and a good deal of the brains ; that we have helped materially to save a million souls, and befriended a people that were worth helping and recognise their friends.

CHAPTER IX

JEWISH COLONISATION IN RUSSIA

SLACKNESS is the vice of statesmen. They rarely take the trouble to find out how their problems are faced and met in other countries. How few Royal Commissions and select committees call evidence as to the methods and results of parallel policies even in America and our own Dominions. But there is a third post-war parallel to our colonisation of Jews in Palestine.

It is the fashion—perhaps one should say that it is only good form in a patriotic Britisher—to attribute the worst actions, or at least the worst of motives, to anything done by the Government of the U.S.S.R. Indeed, I am prejudiced against the work of the Russians in settling the Jews in the Ukraine because I want the Jews in Palestine.[1]

But it is constructive work well done and deserves notice. It should serve as an example, both to Palestine and to Great Britain. They have put 60,000 Jews on the land;[2] they hope to put 500,000 there, if the

[1] Mikael Kalenin, the President of the Great Russian Republic, takes the opposite view. Speaking at the annual meeting of the Ozet, November 17th, 1926, he said: "I consider that it would be absolutely inadmissible from the point of view of the Soviet *régime* that the Jewish toiling masses should desert us in search of happiness elsewhere (loud applause). Comrades, I hold that the Soviet Union should be the fatherland, ten times a more real fatherland for the Jewish masses, than any bourgeois Palestine (loud applause)," and so on.

[2] On January 1st, 1927, the figures were: Pre-war colonies, 10,217 families; spontaneously settled since war, 11,717 families; planned settlement, 11,985 families.

bourgeois Jews will find the money to equip the land. If they succeed they will have surpassed Greece, for they have had no loan from England guaranteed by the League of Nations, and Russia is a land where anti-semitism used to be universal.

In Russia under the U.S.S.R. there are some 2,750,000 Jews—1,750,000 in the Ukraine, 550,000 in Great Russia, and 450,000 in White Russia alongside Poland. It is supposed that 200,000 were butchered during the civil wars by the Whites and the Greens, and as many more may have died of disease and starvation. But the Reds dealt out disaster also ; if they did not kill like the bands of Denikin and Petloura their policy brought ruin to the Jews of the pale. For the large majority of the Jews of Russia were compelled by old law to confine themselves to urban trades in the smaller towns ; they were mostly shopkeepers and pedlars and dealers. Under the Soviets such people count for nothing ; under the Soviets such people are not wanted ; for the Soviets trade, and the co-operative societies take the place of small shops and chain-stores, and the small trader cannot compete with success. These trading people were on the bread-line before the war ; they starve now. They are only kept alive by the remittances of their charitable relations in America. They thought for a moment that the new economic policy of Lenin would save them, that once again they might find a place in the machinery of production. But it was in vain ; the greater economy of the bigger enterprise of the co-operative stores have driven the small man for ever out of business. In Russia they have done in a hurry for the Jews what we are doing slowly and unconsciously for workers who are no longer wanted in a dying industry ; but the difference is that in Russia the small shopkeeper is a Jew who was never allowed to be anything but a small shop-

keeper. The economic results are the same, but the difference is that the Russian Government has tried to do something to fix up the small shopkeeper in another more productive trade. The British Government may yet be forced to act on the same lines, if not for the shopkeepers at least for the thousands of displaced miners.

Faced, therefore, with the extreme destitution, exceeding anything we know in England, of 1,000,000 displaced workers, the U.S.S.R. had to act. They acted the more readily because they saw the eyes of all the Jews of Russia turned longingly towards Palestine, and the U.S.S.R., wiser than Louis XIV. or Philip II., does not seek to lose 1,000,000 useful workers. " If it is land they want," they seemed to say, " they can have it in Russia without drifting into the accursed British Empire and becoming lost to the revolution." So, in November, 1924, they appointed the Comzet—a Commission for Jewish land settlement—and placed at the head of it that capable administrator, Mr. Peter Smidovitch.

The Comzet had no lack of applicants for land ; they could pick and choose those who had some capital. They had first to look for land. For any such settlement the land must be in large blocks so that settlers can be near to each other to learn from and help each other ; community life is the only life in the East. Fortunately they have expropriated the landlords in Russia ; the old emancipated serfs could not or did not wish to cultivate all the wide estates of their late masters, and so land could be found by the Comzet—land which, as in Macedonia, was not being used, and yet could be used. Such land they took ; they found it in the Crimea, in the Ukraine by Kherson, and by the old Jewish agricultural colonies in the Steppes.

For there are old Jewish farm colonies, founded even

a hundred years ago for enfranchised Jews who were allowed to work outside the pale. Nearly 50,000 Jews were living so at the end of the European War, and that number had doubled by 1924 through unassisted settlement of refugees from the towns. As successive waves of Denikin and Wrangel swept over them they were massacred and their buildings destroyed; but the land is the only source of life in Russia, and perforce the remnant had reassembled, reconstructed and gone on again as peasants have ever done since the foundation of the world.

Having found some 280,000 acres of land and had 25,000 applications from Jewish families Mr. Smidovitch had then the far more difficult task of obtaining the cash to start the settlers. The Government would do something, though naturally as little as possible, so Mr. Smidovitch turned to the Jews. He got the Ozet formed, an association of Jews in Russia who would collect for settlement in the Ukraine as opposed to settlement in Palestine; they made it quite clear that they approved of such Jews, and disapproved as strongly of the Zionist brand of Jew. In fact advocates of Zionism were now sent to Siberia. Then, being a wise man, he turned to American Jews. These, being philanthropists on an immense scale, had throughout the War and the civil wars been supporting the Jews of Eastern Europe—keeping them alive. To these he now turned with a constructive programme, and one that has succeeded.

It may be thought remarkable that Conservative American Jews should have supported so warmly the Soviet Government—that they should prefer that to the support of similar settlements in Palestine. A variety of causes account for this, in so far as they have such a definite preference. They have always been accustomed, through established institutions, to

the charitable support of the Jews of the pale. It has been like mission work to Englishmen. Zionism is a sort of break away, the invention especially of the Russian Jew, new and radical. The richer American Jew of German origin prefers not to be associated with these newer immigrants to America. Zionism looks like being pro-English, and, therefore, to them, anti-American—though Mr. Hearst's New Year's Message may have made some difference in this respect. Also for the same expenditure of money in charity many more people are set up in life upon the land in Russia. The Russian Government, unlike the British Government, will help ; the settlers have not so far to be moved ; the land is available, and has not to be bought at a fancy price. It is not the homeland ; but it means reasonable safety, and proves as well as Palestine that Jews can be colonists and make a success of agriculture. In fact, it enables them to stand up to the Zionists as patriotic Jews, to disprove the charge of being merely charity-mongers.[1] Moreover, the support given by these heads of the great American manufacturing industries to Soviet Russia is a good introduction for their trade. Almost alone of the Powers of the world, America has not recognised in any way the Government of the U.S.S.R. ; neither American business nor the American Government are at all indisposed to have this sort of unofficial contact just because there is no official contact. For these reasons Mr. Smidovitch turned successfully to the charity of the American Jews.

The Joint Distribution Board, which supplies the sinews of war for Zionism and Jewish charities abroad,

[1] Kalenin, in the speech already quoted, said : " Undoubtedly the organisation of agricultural communes, the organisation of a peasant agricultural State, is one of the best means of preserving the Jewish nation as a nation."

set up the Agro-Joint Committee presided over by Dr. Joseph Rosen, and in 1926 sent £1,500,000 to Soviet Russia. The duties of the Agro-Joint are to help the settlers select land, to survey it, to prepare the land, dig or repair wells, organise the transport and construction, plough with their fleets of tractors, lend money for seeds and plants, for live stock, implements, and building material; they will also advance capital for co-operative creameries, flour mills and other industrial enterprise connected with agriculture. Above all, the Agro-Joint provides an admirable service of trained instructors to inspect, advise and teach the new settlers. Except the services of these instructors and of the sanitary services all else that the Agro-Joint supplies is on credit, charged up against the settlers; but the advances from the Government are a prior charge.

For the Government has advanced as much at least as the Agro-Joint. They have supplied land, said to be worth £3,200,000 in pre-war times, free of tax (*i.e.*, rent) for three years; they have made rebates of specially low passenger and freight rates, so that the refugees could reach their new homes; they have given some 50,000 acres of forest land for timber for the buildings; and, in cash or credit, have advanced £150,000. By 1926 it could be said that 500 Jewish schools had been established by the Ukraine Government where the teaching was in Yidisch; and a Jewish teachers' seminary had been established, and a Jewish chair at the University.

Two-thirds, therefore, of the cost of settlement has been borne by the Agro-Joint or by the U.S.S.R.; the remaining third has been met by the settler himself. Only those who could put up from 300 to 400 roubles are considered at all as applicants; most have still far larger savings from their old ruined life. The

average cost per family to the Agro-Joint has worked out at £140 only, and it is stated that refunds to the Government on account of their advances have begun already. The equipment is, of course, more on the scale of the refugee settlements in Macedonia than the more civilised scale of Palestine. One does not see chimneys ; there are mud floors, wooden shacks, often dug-outs to live in ; but there is the good rich black soil of the Ukraine, which has made it the granary of the world.

So there are now, at the end of 1926, some 100 Jewish agricultural Soviets, and 60,000 new Jews on the land, planted on from 40 to 50 acres per family of five. The applicants, far from diminishing, now number 30,000 families. Two and a half million acres are still available for further settlement if the capital for equipment were to hand. Also in 1926 the Government established an autonomous Jewish district in Kherson, of which the population was 85 per cent. Jew.

As in Palestine, the old pre-war colonies were larger aggregations on wider areas of land ; they ran up to 6,000 acres and 100 families. The newer colonies consist of from twenty to seventy families, and 2,000 acres is about as large as can now be obtained without disturbing the existing Russian peasants. Relations with these peasants are at least as good as with the Arabs in Palestine ; many agricultural and sanitary services serve both races. There is no anti-semitism on the open land under the open sky where all are carrying on the same fight with nature.

I do not gather that they are as happy, as reborn, as are the Chaluzim of Palestine ; they are too close to their cares and their past. The happiest colony reported on was that at Mishmar in the Crimea, where they were still hoping to go on to Palestine. There, too, they danced the " hora " till the dawn. They

seem to be more religiously inclined than in Palestine; they are said to want synagogues built in the colonies. But that may be merely a human touch to secure the sympathetic contributions of the charitable American Jew. I suspect they want schools more than synagogues, and breeding stock most of all.

As for their rights to the land and their tenure of it, they stand exactly where all the peasants of Russia stand to-day. The peasant holds the land from the State at an annual rent (or tax) based roughly upon the area and productive capacity of the land he cultivates. The State has given up basing the tax upon the gross produce, because they discovered that under that tax the peasant simply cut down production. One wishes they would learn the same obvious lesson in Palestine. The more important condition of their tenure is that of self-labour. The law says :—

> The right of enjoyment of land is allowed to all citizens who desire to cultivate it with their own labour . . . with security of tenure. . . .

The land may be sub-let (provided the whole family letting the land does not give up direct cultivation of the land due to change of residence), but only for a maximum period of six years, and at the end of that period, if the owner is not prepared to work it himself, it reverts to the public treasury. In no case must hired labour be employed unless all the owner's family is simultaneously working under the same conditions and rates of pay, and then only at exceptional times.

In all such matters the Jews now enjoy the same rights and penalties as the rest of the inhabitants of Russia, except that the new men are for three years rent (or tax) free. How far they should co-operate together in the new colonies is left to the settlers. In some cases there is still the old English open field

system with the holdings periodically re-distributed in strips. Elsewhere, apparently, each man has his definite boundary as in modern England. Sometimes there is the commune similar to the Kvutzoth of Palestine. As the laws or charters governing the Kvutzoth in Palestine are completely unfixed at present, it may be worth pointing out that in Russia the matter has been regulated, one does not know how satisfactorily. The rules must state the conditions of admission and withdrawal of members; the method of purchase and use of equipment and stock and stores; all sales must be accounted for; the individual's share in the common work is indicated, also the rules for the common working and management, etc. No doubt in Palestine these rules should be the result of experience on the spot, but some such rules will be required soon, and I am not certain that delay in the repayment of advances in Palestine is not due to the completely fluid state of the present unchartered, unincorporated Kvutzah.

So long as the Government is favourable there is unlimited land for settlement by the Jews in Russia, and there will be an unlimited supply of unemployed Jews to go on to the land; the obstacle will always be the absence of sufficient capital to establish the settlers. Those Jews who have established themselves since the war and made good at agriculture have done more than make good for themselves. Like their compatriots in Palestine they have shown the world that Jews can be producers as well as middle-men—can conquer the earth like any hardy race of men, and that justice was all Jews needed to restore them to their respected place as pioneers of the civilisation of the world. The creation of a Jewish peasantry has already affected the position of Jews all over the world, and even in the eyes of the Governments of Hungary, Poland and Roumania to

be a Jew is no longer to be one whom it is desirable to despise.

It will be seen that the Government of the U.S.S.R. has done everything that was humanly possible to rescue the victims of the economic change which wrecked the livelihood of the Jews. It will be observed that the setting up of the Comzet under Mr. Smidovitch is precisely the same step as I advocate in order to make sure and obvious the co-operation of the Government of Palestine with the Zionist settlement. No Englishman contemplating what the Russian Government has done in this matter can fail to deplore that his own Government has fallen short even of Russian standards. In Russia assistance has been given, capital from outside has been welcomed, settlement encouraged, land found, schools and training and experimental stations paid for. In Russia these Communists, whom we have been taught to despise, have seen that the setting up of men as free men upon free land "is in consonance with the interests of the State." Let us hope that we, too, shall learn that lesson, both in Palestine and in England.

CHAPTER X

THE NEW JEWISH WORKER

I HAVE known Labour leaders from San Francisco to Madras. They do not differ greatly; common to all of them is a tendency to talk, a need to bluff, and a longing for a quiet life. They have all "arrived" and are pleased with themselves; they are all self-made and proud of it. Extremists are the bane and curse of their existence—they spoil everything. We all got there by being extreme in our time, but the time ought to have stopped then. Every Left-winger is a resurrection of some skeleton out of a cupboard, and the skeletons compete with us in the race, till we fall exhausted into a Government appointment. Then the skeletons put on flesh in their turn.

The competition is so severe that we cannot have many ideals or enthusiasms left. No one really worships Marx, and Lenin has as yet been canonised only in Russia. The good of humanity is the good of my party or of my trades union; we can see more clearly what is good for us, but one no longer gazes at the stars to discover it.

With the Jewish Labour leaders it is different; they still have an ideal in their passionate devotion to Zionism. And Zionism is not going so very well, which fact makes them more anxious about their cause than about their bread and butter or their reputation. Most Jews seem anxious to create a good impression, anxious about what you will think of them; but the

Labour leaders at Tel Aviv were thinking of the accounts of Solel Boneh and the finances of their co-operative societies—not at all of the impression that they were making on a stranger. This made their manners good ; one felt that they were all University men, I expect many of them were.[1] Their hatred of the Communist is not because he is a Left-wing skeleton, but because he is anti-Zionist in Russia. The Communists return the compliment, and Mr. Saklatvala is anti-Zionist in the House of Commons, or M. Kalenin in Moscow.

There are two distinct Labour parties in Palestine—one, the Poale Zion, collectivist ; the other individualist—both being Zionist. It may seem inconceivable, but so strong is their prepossession for the land of their fathers that they do not hate each other. It will seem even more improper, but they do not really hate the capitalist either. The fact is that they have definite and pressing work to do in the reconstruction of Israel. They have to raise the Arab worker up, and keep the Jewish worker from slipping down ; and they know that this is the most vital work in Zionism. Palestine will never be the land of the Jews unless the Jews are the workers. The permanence of the two different civilisations side by side, must inevitably end in Jews being on top, directing, employing and exploiting a native subject race. Jews can do the exploiting business in Frankfort or in Jersey City ; if that were all that Zionism should achieve, the Labour leaders of Palestine—Bengurion and Bensvi, and Czertok and Sprinzak—would shoot themselves.

So they are too harassed and busy to talk much at

[1] In fact, the organised workers of Palestine have been educated as follows : 4·4 per cent. University, 40 per cent. Secondary Schools, 30 per cent. Elementary Schools, 22 per cent. home educated. Twenty-four per cent. speak Hebrew.

street corners, or to hate much, or to think much about themselves. Somehow or other they have become educated men—even modest men. They have made so many experiments and failed so often ; they are nursing with infinite care so many puling babies. The capitalist is no enemy of theirs, for they want him to lend them capital ; every investment of his capital in Palestine is welcomed as helping them in their struggle to hold the Jews up and raise the Arab. What they want is work, and for that capital is necessary : for that land also is necessary ; and their exasperation is expended upon the Palestinian Government which holds back land, not upon the capitalist who brings capital to Palestine. Now that Captain Trumpledor has fallen in the breech there is no more popular figure in Palestine than Rutenberg.

The number of Jewish workers in Palestine is given as 32,000 [1] (20,500 men and 11,500 women) of whom over 23,000 are in their trades union and affiliated with the General Federation and the Palestinian Labour Party. Tel Aviv, the newest town, is naturally their stronghold, and they control the government of the city. The responsibility of governing a city at a time of serious unemployment has done much to damp down the *Klassenkampf* ideas that they brought from Poland and the University. Yet the Jewish worker's background is still continental ; Socialism is their religion. I spoke lightly of the class war and Marx. They knew I was their friend, and they became distressedly uncomfortable. It was as though I had spoken lightly of the Bible to an English working-class audience.

[1] A census in September, 1926, gave roughly : Agriculture, 8,000 ; manufacture, 2,000 ; building trades, 6,500 ; industrial work, 4,000 ; transport, 1,000 ; woodworking, 2,000 ; artisans, 3,000 ; metal workers, 2,000 ; employees, 1,500 ; railways and ports, 1,500 ; various, 1,000.

In spite of all the theories, Palestinian trades unions are not meant for fighting capitalists. The Friendly Society side is pronounced, and the Co-operative Society side far more developed than with us. From the co-operative they have developed into the guild, acquired capital and credit, and taken on the whole of purchase, production and sale. The motor drivers, the camel drivers, and the co-operative women weaving in their mill, are examples; but the greatest guild is the builders' (called Solel Boneh), which builds and contracts and makes roads and reclamation.

Nor are their guild unions solely industrial. Unlike other trades union movements they do not at all confine themselves to wage earners; unlike other countries the strongest, most inclusive, trades union is the agricultural workers, most of whom are working for themselves. Each Kvutzah agricultural colony is an agricultural guild or commune, possessing their own capital, doing their own buying and selling, acting as one unit. While each individualist agricultural colony consists of members of one union, buying and selling and insuring through the union.

No other country in the world can show so marked a development of the trades union into the Operating Guild.

For this there are many reasons. They have had, for instance, a clean slate to work upon; everything was starting and they started everything. Under such circumstances they could not waste time fighting Rutenberg and Rothschild, obvious benefactors bringing capital to their aid. Palestinian life is like life on a desert island; all are thrown together, all must pull together or perish. No question of the division of the spoils can arise, for there are no spoils. Capital and labour cannot fight each other when they are both fighting nature for a bare living; still less when they

are both fighting for the national cause amid a world of enemies.

The national cause depends upon the Jewish worker doing work in Palestine. The worker understands this; so does the Zionist Organisation. Thus we see the Zionist Organisation providing capital, both for Rutenberg and for the trades unions. The loaned funds of the Zionists start the capital of the Guild. The fact that they can obtain such loans has given courage to the trades union leaders to try out on the new lines as co-operative contractors. There is no ridicule, no jealousy of the new guilds, as of the Builders' Guild in England; everybody in the Jew national struggle wants them to succeed—would feel that it reflected a slur upon their race if they failed. In such an atmosphere the new trades guilds and co-operative colonies have the very best chances, as well as a stimulus not to be found elsewhere in the world.

Nor is the co-operation between the workers and the Zionist Executive to be found only in reproductive finance. Both to an indeterminate degree are, or feel themselves, responsible for the maintenance of unemployed Jewish trades unionists. Both, having very little money for anything, and less to throw away, have to co-operate in keeping down the expense, in keeping the poor alive, and in finding work. Solel Boneh takes on building contracts for which it knows the purchaser cannot pay on completion, and counts upon the Anglo-Palestinian Bank not foreclosing upon them; while the Anglo-Palestinian Bank lets them have the necessary advance, counting upon assistance from the Zionist funds. This sort of spirit ought to build up a great success—or go lamentably bankrupt. It is the Quaker spirit over again. People who trust one another can take risks; people who pool their

interests, as do all the Jews in Palestine, cannot be divided into capital and labour.

But the Zionists are not the Government of Palestine, and behind all must stand the State. In any crisis the State, too, must co-operate, and workers, and capitalists and the Zionist Executive all get together to press an united cause upon the State. When unemployment has to be faced, the Jewish worker can count on all other Jews helping him with cash, with advice, and on a joint deputation to the political State. It would be too much to say that on all political questions affecting the Jewish workers all Jews stand together. But they certainly do on the question of the payment by the State of a wage upon which Jews can live, as well as upon the question of help for the unemployed. All press for relief works, road-making or reclamation, and the capitalists help Solel Boneh with credit to enable them to tender for making the road from Jaffa to Petach Tikvah.

It is because of this close co-operation between labour and capital that the Jewish worker in his homeland, in spite of traditions of *klassen-kampf*, is changing the protective *rôle* of the trades union into the constructive *rôle* of the trades guild. The change calls for qualities in the workers' leaders other than those generally required by the secretaries of our great trades unions. In Palestine the trades union movement and the co-operative movement have, in fact, coalesced, and the problem they are having to face is to check through the general federation of trades unions the narrow particularism of the guild.

It is instructive to observe that many of the problems which we in England are beginning to probe are to be found in Palestine in a more advanced stage of development. The co-operation between capital and labour at which we are aiming in England, has been forced in

Palestine by common political and economic necessity—a necessity so strongly felt that the sacrifice of class interests became possible. Profit-sharing has become the trades guild. Trades unions and banks combine to find work for and place the unemployed. In agriculture a way has been devised to farm on the large scale and with adequate capital, and yet without the hired labourer paid by the capitalist. None of these experimental solutions of old problems can yet be said to have given definite results; they are all still in the trial stage. Many people in Palestine to-day will protest that I have seen more than yet exists, that I exaggerate the co-operation between capital and labour that has so far arisen. That may be so, but I have not exaggerated the hope that lies behind the eyes of the new Jewish worker in Palestine. He sees in what he is doing, not merely the building up of a Jewish homeland, but the building up of the co-operative commonwealth. He visualises the Jewish worker on a pinnacle, giving a little light to the workers of the world; pioneering not merely in the conquest of nature, but in the solution of the problem of wage-slavery and poverty. The ambition of the Jew knows no bounds, and on Carmel he would have his Statue of Liberty, bearing in her hand that lamp which shines down upon New York.

For many reasons the Zionist world is to-day deploring the prevailing unemployment among the Jewish immigrants in Palestine. At the end of 1926 6,500 were unemployed, mostly in the building and kindred trades. The stocking of the land with Jews has stopped; their enemies are saying: "I told you so!" The advertised success, which made so easy the call for further subscriptions, is dimmed; they can no longer help the refugees from the East to escape to a better land; the Jewish Agency is at its wits' end to know what to do.

Amid all these shadows let us observe the light. Hard times have brought the Jews together, accentuating the inter-dependence of capital and labour. The Government, indifferent to Jewish prosperity, is beginning to offer a helping hand, and the Jewish worker is finding his feet and learning his lesson. They are still querulous, of course—like all workers. The Zionist Agency is not doing enough, the Government is indifferent to their sufferings, and so on and so forth. But they are not Easterners to sit still with folded hands and die by inches. If they cannot get help they help themselves. The lesson they are learning may well be worth the suffering.

This year the Labour Department of the Zionist Executive, working in conjunction with the trades union, have helped in placing out and establishing 5,300 Jewish agricultural workers in the older Jewish colonies, to learn their job and carry on without "the dole." Two thousand of these are at Petach Tikvah and 600 at Hederah. In an attempt to make them independent to some extent of seasonal fluctuations of employment, they were provided with small plots of land, houses of a sort and farm implements. The same energy is being shown in getting the immigrant girls into co-operative working groups, where they can pool resources, help each other and live cheaply. In such groups the hunt for useful work by each member is easier and yet more determined. Among other small sums the Executive advanced £2,000 to start a co-operative stone-quarrying enterprise. Productive relief works have been started in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Tiberias and Afule. In such ways labour and capital are learning to meet and beat the crisis.

Above all, and in every one of these enterprises, they are learning the absolute necessity of getting land. There would be no unemployment in Palestine if the

land which is not being used could be made accessible to the men who want to start doing what other more fortunate Jews are doing at Nahalal and Dagania. For nearly four years no new agricultural colony has been started—and all for want of land and the capital to equip it. Deep in the consciousness of every Jewish worker in Palestine is now the certainty that the land question is at the root of all their difficulties.

CHAPTER XI

ZIONISM

An Englishman need not apologise for being a Zionist, but he may well apologise for attempting to explain what Zionism means to the Jew of to-day and may mean to the Jew of to-morrow. It has in an Englishman a disagreeable air of patronage. Moreover, the explanation has been already given by men of genius, to whom, by reason of their race, Zionism means everything in life; with them no Englishman can possibly compete. But I can show why thousands of my race in two hemispheres join hands with the Jews in their struggle, and what we hope for from the results of success—what we hope for and from the Jews.

Most uneducated people hate Jews; that is common form throughout the world. Partly, that feeling is inherited from those dark and dismal times when the priestly guides created the prejudice that formed public opinion; partly because Jews bought and sold, making the best of the bargains, those who sold to and bought from them disliked the customer—especially when they had to pay by instalments. But I think they were hated above all because they were foreigners, and very foreign—strange in their manners, in their customs, even in their religion. All foreigners are disliked by the settled folk among whom they come, especially if they cling together and either do not, or cannot mix. They are strange animals, not belonging to the herd. The savage man has no pity for such, and the pack chases them to death. The distrust of the

foreigner is more thoroughgoing in England than elsewhere; for we are an island. And if the raw Englishman is not more anti-semite than the raw men of other lands it is only because he sees no difference between any of these foreigners. When in a certain temper he will (or would in old days) set the dogs on any strange people—Irish, Gipsy, Lombard, Dutchman, Polak or Jew. Whichever race happened to be most unpopular at the moment, to that race of foreigners was attributed all mysterious evils and terrible occurrences, from the white slave traffic to the " corruption " of children in Socialist Sunday Schools. No Englishman could possibly do such a thing; it must obviously be the work of some " dirty foreigner." The Ku-Klux-Klan brackets Jew and Irishman as objects of loathing; but the uneducated Englishman brackets the lot.

If the fact that they were always and everywhere strangers accounts for the rough-house that Jews have always met with at the hands of roughs, the contempt that they have, till quite recently, met with at the hands of educated people has done them quite as much moral injury—so much so that they have only recently discovered the cause of this contempt. The slighting attitude of the educated towards Jews is not because they are strangers and Jews, but because they so often pretend not to be Jews; because by denying their race they seem to be asking for contempt. Pretence is the " crime," for the secret reason for that pretence is fear, which causes lack of national self-respect. To the educated Anglo-Saxon that alone stands in the way of complete acceptance. Assimilation, and the desire for assimilation, merely emphasise the crime of fear.

The Anglo-Saxon, more than any other race, wants to sympathise with the Jew, and would like to settle up for these last 2,000 years. They would like to get on

to terms of mutual respect ; they have for Jews a sort of affection which is perhaps a little patronising and just a little nervous—of their brains. We both are moneylenders, and unpopular ; we, too, are wanderers among strange peoples ; we, too, are traders, and if we rather look down on those with whom we trade, that is only what the Jews do too. We, too, find in the Old Testament, or Torah, convenient justification for all that needs justification in our relations with mankind. We, too, can laugh at ourselves, so sure are we of being in reality the Chosen People. Having all these tastes in common, no doubt we understand the Jew better than can those to whom the Old Testament is not familiar from infancy. To the foreigner the word Jew is a hissing in the street ; to us the word suggests Solomon and Moses, and a thousand cradle stories. So often have we used their names for our own children that they seem now to be our fathers, specially our Puritan forefathers, of whom we can only remember that which was good. When my ancestors hewed down the aristocrats at Wigan Lane and at Naseby they were armed with the names of Aaron and of Abner ; and they rallied to the charge, calling on the God of Izrael in the language of the prophets.

There is no bond like familiarity with the same history, except familiarity with the same children's books ; the same exclusive quotations give just that feeling of superiority to all those who can use them. These are passwords which form the foundation of family exclusiveness.

Insensibly our attitude towards various nationalities is bound up with the feature or two in their history with which we were familiar when young. All our conception of the nation takes colour from that period and dramatic struggle. The Dutch to us are always Father William—still silent, defying Alva and all the

powers of hell. We have since that day had many wars with the Dutch; but, by reason of that heroic century the Dutch to-day and the House of Orange are dearer to us than are any other Continental people. France was defeated at Crecy and at Agincourt, but that was a dead old France. The French Republic means to us *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité,* and we still hear Danton thundering from the tribune, pass with young Barbaroux to the guillotine, and see the gallant Ney facing the firing squad at dawn. The modern French may not be like that, but we think they are, and are conscious of a lump in the throat as our men pass over to Flanders to the tune of the Marseillaise.

So, too, the Jews! They went before us long ago—a pillar of cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night—guiding the world. Moses led out from Egypt the first non-conformists, the first free-thinkers to break away from idolatry and priestly rule. Judah Maccabeus led the first national rising against the rule of tyrants—led it to victory 1,600 years before Swiss or Scotch or Dutch followed in the footsteps of these Jewish peasants; while in between Moses and the Maccabees lie all those familiar Bible stories, with Joshua holding up the sun at noon, and all the Psalms of David. Towards such a people one has a feeling almost of awe, they are so well known, and yet so old and so eternal. For us they too have assuredly made their proofs.

The Dutch, the Swiss, the Greeks, the Irish—all the little peoples who have struggled, suffered and gained their freedom—need no man's sympathy now. They have achieved their homeland. With the Jews this is not so, and they have suffered far more and far longer than the others. We know all about it, for English literature has not been slow to blazon it in verse and prose with hot denunciation. If Jews were not so rich we should be far more vocal with our sympathy, for

the Anglo-Saxon hates cruelty and injustice as Mediterranean races hate the devil. It has gone on for centuries. Every crusade started with a butchery of Jews. Rights they had none, till clerical influence died down in the eighteenth century; and no lie was too stupid to be told about the Jew and inspire horror.

But the present generation of Englishmen has seen more than its forebears to rouse anger and sympathy. Imperial Russia sent forth the black hundreds to the pogroms which swept through the ghettos of Russia, slaying all ages and sexes in the name of Christ. Red Russia followed, and the Jews starved; the white armies of Wrangel and Denikin slew Jews as Bolshevics; and Petloura's Green Terror completed the massacre of the unarmed. The nations that had lost the War discovered the fault in the Jews; the nations that had won covered up their gains with the camouflage cry of "profiteers." Anti-semites murdered Ratenau and Eisner in Germany, and, in Hungary, buried Jews alive as a matter of sport. These things are so recent that they remain in the memory, storing up, not so much sympathy for the Jew as hatred for the anti-semites and contempt for the nations that produce them. Gradually such countries as Poland, Hungary and Roumania are acquiring to English tastes the odour of the unspeakable Turk; that Professor Cusa and his Roumanians should dare to persecute Jews is becoming insolence to us. Palestine is under our protection, and those who are against the Jews are against us.

Is it any wonder that intelligent Englishmen are Zionist? It is the reply to the anti-semites, that we are tired of their lies and vulgarities. The Jews may have their faults in English eyes, but at least they are better than this scum who reproduce in the twentieth, the inhuman vices of the sixteenth century. We know

that the Jews have better brains than ourselves, but now we are Zionists we take a certain pride in their brains ; it reflects credit on the family. We know, too, that they share our love of liberty and independence ; that, like ourselves, they take risks ; that, like ourselves, they will call no man master. Finally, that they appreciate us. There is some satisfaction in helping these people, and obviously Zionism provides the way in which we can help. It is as obvious to us as to them that Zionism is what was wanted to put the Jews right with the world.

When I am asked why I, so strong an individualist, support the Labour Party, I answer that Labour does not seek to make laws, but men ; that the co-operative commonwealth can only exist among real men ; and that we have first to destroy that subservience among the working class which 2,000 years of submission has created. The Labour Party straightens the back of the labouring man, and with power over his own fate comes self-respect and self-reliance. It is not so much what they will *do*, as how they will *feel* when Labour rules.

Because the Jews have always been in the position of petitioners for justice, because they have never been the dispensers of justice, they, like the British working class, beg too much and expect too little, lacking confidence in their rights and in themselves. Zionism is now doing for the Jews what the Labour Party seeks to do for the British working class—creating self-confidence and corporate self-respect. Jews no longer disguise the fact that Jews are doing rather well in Palestine, proving that their race is still young and vigorous. It has become something to be nationally proud of. They were not sure that they could do it, and now they believe that they are doing it better than any other race could. Better still, they see other

people becoming proud of their acquaintance, rubbing their eyes with surprise at the Jew on horseback, unselfconscious. It is putting all the Jews on horseback, though most of them may never hope to see Zion. In such manner Zionism is making men of the Jews; where it has taken root, pogroms become laughable, as well as risky. I do not underrate the pride that comes from having a national place on the map, but it is the way their men are filling that place that has put the Jews in the sun. At last people smile at them, and say, with a new emphasis, "*Those* men are Jews." The long-lost heir, with the strawberry mark on his left shoulder, is coming back to his own, and the lookers-on nudge each other with interest.

It is trite to say that if you respect yourself others will respect you, but it is true of the race as of the individual, and the reverse is true also. So has Zionism created a fresh atmosphere for the Jews throughout the world. M. Bénes, the great statesman of Czecho-Slovakia, put it to me in a gesture. He held up his little finger crooked, and then straightened it, saying: "That is what Zionism is doing for the Jew." The danger is that it may do too much—the reaction might make them intolerable with its combination of racial and intellectual pride.

If one may be permitted racial comparisons, consider Jews and Scots and Poles. All now have intense patriotism and pride of race; all have brains above the run of the people among whom they mix; all have a history of which they are even boringly proud. The Scots, ever since we can remember, always assumed that other peoples would look up to them and envy their accent; and that is what has generally happened in consequence. The Jews always assumed that other peoples would look down on them and envy their wealth; and that is what has generally happened in

consequence. The Poles were both ; when they looked east they were the Scots ; when they looked west they were the Jews. The Poles have now joined the Scots in the haven of freedom, and have immediately become intolerable, making nationalism into a bye-word and passing on to those who can be kicked the kicks they formerly received from Russia or from Germany. What will happen to the Jews ?

What has happened to the Jews at the moment is that their status has improved. They hold up their heads and can answer back rather sharply, where previously they washed their hands with invisible soap and acquiesced with alacrity to all that was said or done. They " yessed the world." Now they require consideration, expect it, and get it. If they do not yet get such consideration in Roumania, Hungary and Poland, it is because those countries are backward in appreciation of modern politics, or because the Jews who live in those countries are not yet alive to the meaning of Zionism. The Roumanian Minister, requiring loans from America, found that he could raise no money there. Even Queen Marie failed in her quest. Roumania is not well thought of in America on account of certain little stupidities of Professor Cusa and others ; and the Roumania Minister, crying out at the discovery, protests that the Jews are persecuting Roumania. That is not so, of course. The opinion of Roumania held by the Jews, not a very flattering one I am afraid, has never changed ; what has changed is the feeling in America about what Roumanians should or should not do to Jews. So Roumania, or Hungary, with its *numerus clausus*, becomes out of the fashion—a trifle *démodé*. But Roumanians are quick at picking up the tone from their superiors when once it is clearly indicated, and all will soon be well there. Hungary is less apt, less conscious of superiors. Poland cannot

understand how gentlemen can possibly treat Jews as equals, and is excessively annoyed about these new-fangled manners of the West. They got on very well with the Jews in the old days ; then, before they were spoilt, Jews understood their place and there was no trouble.

The change in tone is not solely due to Zionist propaganda and the success in Palestine, the linking-up of Zionism with Great Britain has opened men's eyes. Great Britain is obviously " trying to get something out of the Jews " ; in a world of *real politik* nothing is done for disinterested motives. We must be trying to get from them some political or commercial or financial advantage. But, if it is worth our while to make friends with the Jews, it may well be worth while for other people to do so too. " After all, no harm is done by civility ; if the English find the Jews worth courting, why not court them too ? In spite of the League of Nations one can never tell when one may not want friends. Perhaps the Jews are useful citizens although they are not Christians."

So they seem to say. That attitude is perceptible in Germany and France. It may have had something to do with the exceedingly generous assistance given by the U.S.S.R. towards planting the unemployed Jews upon the land in the Ukraine. " We are going to keep our Jews " is taking the place of " Clear out the Jews." Most European nations have got to the stage of saying : " Well, at any rate, our Jews will not want to go to Palestine ; they are comfortable here." Indeed, though I protest my own disinterestedness, I do conceive that British support for Zionism may not be unconnected with a consciousness that it is useful for Great Britain to have a friendly people just in that corner of the Levant ; and, indeed, that it is useful, all round the world, to find in authority men who will

probably view English aims and policy with some sympathy.

Once, during the war and the Russian Revolution, I was sent by the British Government on a mission of some strangeness and difficulty through Siberia. The Government could do little for me save provide the cash, but I carried with me an open letter addressed to all the Jews of Russia and signed by Messrs. Weizmann and Sokolov, which should always serve to help in times of need "the friend of the Jews." That was my sufficient passport.

Nor is it only men in authority whose help matters. The attitude of friendship of the scattered Jewish race towards England matters, and must make a difference to our comfort in the world. I went to Munkacs, which is now Mucachevo, a little town under the Carpathians, where the people are one-third Ruthene, one-third Hungarian and one-third Jew; and there between 100 and 200 Jewish children lined up to do honour to the Englishman; they were learning English, as though out of gratitude, and making speeches in undreamt-of English in which the Balfour Declaration seemed equivalent to *Magna Carta*, *Habeas Corpus* and the Petition of Right. The Magyars had no more loyal friends, before and through this war, than these Jews of Hungary. The Magyar repaid the Jew with the butcheries of the White Terror, so that all these Jews, with their world fallen about their ears, divided, not knowing where to turn, looked to England, the only people who have ever shown them a little kindness.

This change of attitude towards ourselves, which is going on among the Jews all round the world, from Shanghai to San Francisco, ought not merely to add to our comfort but to our use in the world. There are still countries, though they are fewer than they were, where the Jew needs the support of a "big brother"—such

support as England once provided under Palmerston for freedom-loving Italian, Hungarian, Pole or Danish patriots. Support for justice requires no " blockades " nor " sanctions " ; the open expression of British opinion is enough. And, as the sense of mutual obligation and affection grows, England will find no difficulty and no risk in obtaining throughout the East of Europe the same justice and treatment for Jews that British subjects expect and enjoy. The true implications of Zionism go much further than Palestine, much further than the often excessive self-consciousness of nationalism. If we in England understand our part and do our duty Zionism will give peace and justice as well as pride to the Jews, both of Palestine and of the Diaspora—after 2,000 years.

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